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Editor’s Remarks

We are proud to present the 2018 edition of the *Africa Policy Journal*. In this edition, the key themes of security, innovation, and technology alongside critiques of dominant development discourse rise to the forefront. These articles are the product of the hard work of our amazing contributors, who have graciously shared their expertise and knowledge of issues on the African continent.

Aside from the print edition, we have also been working to leverage the many visitors to Harvard from the African continent with expertise in a wide-range of policy issues facing Africa today. To that end we are proud to announce our new interview series focused on African officials and stakeholders, APJ@HKS. We have already published some interviews on our website and have lots of exciting content planned for release in 2018!

We would like to extend our deepest gratitude to this year’s editing team for their hard work. We also thank the Center for African Studies, Dean Doug Elmendorf, Martha Foley, the Harvard Kennedy School Student Government, and the Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy for their continued support over the years.

We thank you for reading and hope that you will continue to be our partner in changing both the perception and reality of the continent’s rise.

Alicia E. Bello
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Mitigating the Sahel Security Conundrum:
The Need for a Strategic Paradigm Shift

Trayo A. Ali

Abstract

The Sahel security conundrum (described in this article as an “immunodeficiency security disorder”) is a unique security dilemma facing the region. The Sahel region represents the “spinal cord” of the continent’s geopolitical body, and as such the phenomena of its security conundrum not only poses a real security threat to Africa, but also the spill-over effects have become a global security nuisance, particularly for Europe. The approach to contain this situation that is driven by multiple factors (unstable politics, terrorism, foreign debts, environmental degradation, civil wars, food insecurity, mass displacement, porous borders, illegal migration, and drug trafficking) requires a strategic paradigm shift that goes beyond the current conventional strategies de-
vised by the national, regional, and international actors involved. Instead, a range of fundamental and structural adjustments are needed, including popular participation as a core issue in redefining good governance, structural reformation of security sectors, qualitative upgrading of humanitarian interventions, and changing and updating school curriculum in humanities – particularly in more vulnerable countries like Sudan and Nigeria – to suit modern educational standards.

Introduction
The Sahel security conundrum, a crisis emanating from the old-fashioned political order and risky arrangements of the region, now not only generates a deeper and wider self-destructive momentum, but also is sending far-reaching shockwaves of hazards that severely affect the entire continental security system, as well as its spill-overs affecting the larger globe, especially Europe. Mitigating the impacts of this immunodeficiency security disorder requires, among other remedies, a fundamental and holistic paradigm shift that must include devising a new conceptual frame for systems of “good governance” that ingrains popular participation as a core issue, adopting structural reformation of the security sector (including army, police, intelligence services, and other security apparatus), introducing structural adjustment on the concept of “partnership with the international community,” and reviewing and standardizing school curricula, particularly in more vulnerable countries like Sudan and Nigeria, in a manner that allows the promotion of the concept of religious tolerance to mitigate the extremist tendencies of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism.

The need for such a structural paradigm shift is now more important than ever because the geopolitical position of the Sahel – which functions as a spinal cord controlling the region’s nervous system – is sending injury signals that could cause a virtual paralysis of continental security, or even its total collapse.

I. Sahel: The Geopolitics and the Current State of Affairs
Precariously balancing the African continent in in almost every aspect – from geography, history, culture, environment, and population to security and politics – the Sahel region stretches from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea coast in the East to the Atlantic Ocean in the West. With a width of 7,034 km from Mogadishu, Somalia to Dakar, Senegal, the region includes countries such as the collapsed Somalia, the small and resource-scarce Djibouti, drought-prone Ethiopia and its archenemy Eritrea, the Islamist hub and ethnically polarized Sudan,
and the newest and highly troubled nation of South Sudan. The Sahel belt further encompasses potentially explosive Chad, drought-stricken Niger, Burkina Faso, war-torn Mali, resource-cursed Nigeria, poor Togo and Benin, religiously tense Cote d’Ivoire, little Gambia, and one relatively stable state, Senegal. The rest of the states in the belt are Mauritania, a target of anti-slavery campaigners, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the two Guineas (Bissau and Conakry). Serving as home to more than one-third of Africa’s population, the Sahel is the origin of most of Africa’s civil wars.

The Sahel’s geographic scope and the unfortunately violent and volatile realities of its component countries have made her the host of the largest international peacekeeping forces. From the environmental perspective, the Sahel belt (boxed in by the Sahara Desert and tropical Africa) is classified as having cyclically hard-hitting environmental degradation records associated with drought, rapidly encroaching desertification, scarce water, and acute food insecurity. Furthermore, in economic and developmental terms, the World Bank has designated all the Sahel countries, except Nigeria, as “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC). This all-around chronic situation is further compounded by the reality that the Sahel region has most of the continent’s refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Moreover, the region has become a fertile breeding ground for the seemingly ever-expanding number of radical Islamist militants, as well as a conducive ground for the proliferation of small arms and international drug trafficking. The Sahel region is also the sole major
exporter and traditional exit corridor for the largest percentage of Africa’s illegal migrants to Europe.

This multi-faceted security crisis facing the Sahel region has already spilled past its boundaries and been felt by the region’s neighbors, and often with terrorism-related events, especially in Kenya, Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR), Cameroon and Ghana. It is this intricate mosaic formula that constitutes the metabolism of the Sahel security nexus.

II. Sahel Security: Actors’ Perspectives and Experts’ Views
The African Union’s (AU) strategic position on Sahel security is spelled out in its document entitled “The AU Strategy for The Sahel Region,” which provides that:

“The present Strategy of the African Union for the Sahel Region is centered on three main pillars: (i) governance; (ii) security; and (iii) development. These three areas, especially the first two, are issues on which the AU has a clear comparative advantage, as per its continental mandate, its experience in the subject matters and its familiarity with the issues at hand.”

However, the AU’s position, at least as reflected in this document, deserves careful examination and comment. While the AU strategy document expresses the continent’s visible concerns over the unique challenges of Sahel security, it also reveals and recognizes, in a contradictory manner, the AU’s profound limitations and its inability to face the challenges
posed by the Sahel. This is quite clear from the subsequent provision of the strategy document:

“It should be recognized that issues of the Sahel zone do not concern Africa only, for some of the threats identified, as the insecurity and terrorism, go beyond the region and the continent. It is in this context that the AU welcomes the interest in the region and the commitment of the United Nations, the European Union (EU), and other international actors.”

The United Nations (UN), like the AU, has expressed clear concerns over the Sahel region. Endorsed by the Security Council in June 2013, the UN adopted what is termed the “Integrated Strategy for the Sahel” [S/2013/354] as a new instrument for “conflict prevention.” The UN strategy “prioritizes life-saving activities in the areas of political, security and humanitarian affairs that meet immediate needs, while building the resilience of people and communities as part of a long-term development agenda.”

Echoing the same spirit, Mr. Romano Prodi, the UN Special Envoy for the Sahel Region, once stated before the UN Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee that: “I have always cautioned that criminal and terrorist activities might spread further if all efforts are not made to improve the economic situation in the countries of the Sahel region. The youth population must be given specific attention, as they are more prone to recruitment by criminal and terrorist networks, especially when few economic opportunities are made available. Equally, we need to be mindful that the Sahel region could be confronted with further insecurity and terrorist activity if structural challenges are not addressed.”

In addition to the above engagements, and apart from the multi-dimensional peacekeeping forces deployed throughout the Sahel hot spots, the UN also supported a new anti-terrorism force proposed by five Sahel nations – Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger. The force, which is anticipated to deploy 5,000 security personnel by March 2018, will cooperate with the ongoing French deployment in the region and will be funded by the five participating countries, the European Union, and the United States.

With these generous responses, it remains one’s considered view that, irrespective of how innovative or responsive, these initiatives and instruments demonstrate one overriding reality: the continued fragility of the Sahel region.

One cannot but wonder whether at any single given point in history a single region has combined such hydra-headed problems like the Sahel does.
Experts’ views on how to contain and mitigate the Sahel security conundrum are critical of the relatively conventional approaches pursued by the AU, the UN, and other global actors.

Mr. Chester Crocker, the high-flying former US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and Ellen Laipson, in a co-authored piece for the New York Times, described the Sahel region as but “the latest front in a long war” and asserted that, “the turmoil in the Sahel is shaping up to be a long-playing conflict that will end well only with the help of African regional organizations, Western nations, nongovernmental groups, and the United Nations.” The authors further expressed that the small and then-recent victory in Mali was “just the beginning of what will likely be a very long struggle for control of the Sahel,” or what they refer to as “the trans-Saharan badlands that stretch from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.” Crocker and Laipson’s views confirm two singularly important points: (1) that the Sahel’s problems are beyond African capacity to address, and (2) that the war in Mali only represents the tip of the iceberg of the Sahel’s long-term security dilemma.

Looking to other experts, Martin Michelot and Martin Quencez of the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, while analyzing Sahel security in their paper on “Why the Sahel Is Crucial to Europe’s Neighborhood – and Its Security Strategy,” noted that:

“Despite receiving official backing from allies on both sides of the Atlantic, the French military intervention in Mali also revealed the reluctance of countries to share the burden for providing security in the Sahel. The problem stems mostly from the divergence of perceptions within Europe on the relevance of the Sahel to its immediate security concerns.”

In the authors’ view, “[t]he first step should therefore be to redefine the scope of Europe’s neighborhood strategy in order to include the Sahel area as a whole.”

Ms. Idayat Hassan, of the Centre For Democracy and Development in Nigeria, more recently argued that “the question to be raised is, whether the EU Sahel Strategy indeed reacts to the concerns and internal dynamics of the region in enough ways to stem insecurity?” Her answer to that question is a resounding “no.” As she explains, “as military operations and increased spending alone won’t root out terrorism or curb illegal migration, the EU and other entities involved in development will have to focus more on addressing the root causes.” She went on to further explain, “all of these goals are already espoused in the EU strategy on the Sahel, but
more political will and prioritization will have to be applied for long-term stability.”

Furthermore, Luca Raineri and Alessandro Rossi of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), in their paper “The Security-Migration-Development Nexus Revised: A Reality Check,” argued that:

“Policymakers and experts have increasingly emphasized the nexus between migration, security and development in the Sahel. Contrary to conventional wisdom, higher levels of economic and human development do not result automatically in a reduction of migratory flows. Sometimes the opposite is the case. Similarly, it would be wise to nuance the view that armed conflicts automatically provoke huge migration flows. Policy frameworks sponsored and designed by foreign actors in the region, such as the European Union and the United States, seem to understand the need for a multi-layered approach but are sometimes stretched to meet inconsistent political demands. There is an urgent need for coherent, more evidence-based and less fear-based policy-making.”

Dr. Jerome Tubiana, a researcher and expert in the affairs of armed non-state actors in the Sahel region, told this author that:

“The two of the major areas that need an structural paradigm adjustment are how to accommodate into power structures the Sahel’s pastoralist cross-border communities (particularly the Tuareg, Tubu, Zaghawa, and Arabs) and how to accommodate the unemployed disgruntled youth into a gainful opportunities. As these always undermine international security arrangements, such initiatives will reduce the random border-crossing activities of these pastoralists and absorbs the disgruntlement of these youth who could easily joint terrorist groups.”

Mr. Rasheed Saeed, a Paris-based Sudanese journalist and editor with TTU Monde Arabe, who has also covered Sahel regional affairs for decades, also gave an interview to this author and summarised his assessment as:

“A combination of socio-political factors are determining region’s instability, including structural defects in power-sharing arrangements, fast-track changes, presences and crisscrossing of foreign militants such as Al Qaeda elements, Daesh affiliates, and Boko Haram fighters, together with the apparently contradictory policy approaches pursued by the superpower actors, irreconcilable priorities of the region’s governments, and fast fragmentation of local communities are all compounded to fuel and inflame the situation, and further minimize any available opportunities and/or chances that could be utilized to confront this fast-deteriorating situation.”

Commenting on the recent shock
created by the slave-auctioning reports from Libya, Dr. Amgad Fareid, a researcher and analyst on the Horn of Africa’s political affairs, holds that:

“The tightness of border control policies and the blockade of asylum routes is the main cause for the return of slave trade to the modern age by this scale. In reality, most of the refugees and/or migrants, as the EU now want their name to be, are not being kidnapped against their will. They resort to smugglers as their only choice to find their way out of conditions of ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ or in which their physical, legal, and material safety and their dignity and basic rights cannot be made available. The international law gives them the right to seek refuge, but in the absence of safe pathways of obtaining this right, resorting to smugglers becomes the only choice. While refugees are rights’ agents, smugglers are not rights’ defenders, they are doing this as for-profit business and they can easily turn sides, as has been proven by the Italian measures. Putting a price tag on stopping refugees, whether by aid packages to failed regimes that are part of the root causes of the asylum phenomena or by direct payments to militias, is the first step of the commodification of refugees and taking away their humane identity. This does turn them to goods in the eyes of illegal gangs. Then human trafficking finds its conducive environment to grow with the goods made available and free of charge or with a little price. The same smugglers are turned to traffickers by the currently implemented security measures for double profit. The other ugly fact about the outrageous western reaction to the slave trade crisis is the attempts to use it to force asylum seekers/refugees back to the situations they were trying to flee in the first place, without working on solving the roots of their problems or guaranteeing their safety. This would be the most unethical, unprincipled, and wicked European act, since Europe decided that it ‘discovered’ Africa.”

What is particularly important here is the surfacing of the slavery and slave trading issue, which is by all means a testimony of the vulnerability and complexity of the Sahel regional affairs and challenges. The extent of this vulnerability and complexity further speaks to the existence of their root causes that have not been eliminated, and hence the possibilities of the continued reemergence of such issues.

IV. The Needed New Thinking, New Approaches, New Paradigms, and New Security Order

To diagnose the underlying causes of the Sahel’s immunodeficiency security disorder, it is imperative to subject the region’s entire political ecosystem to a critical and careful an-
atomical analysis, from every dimension. A comprehensive and dynamic approach that helps to determine both the congenital and/or secondary nature of the threats is important, as that would help to develop an alternative paradigm system.

Picking up issue by issue, it is this author’s view that the conglomeration of factors propelling the immuno-deficiency disorder in the Sahel’s security can generally be grouped under four major categories of history, geography, religion, and identity, as well as the very critical and broader issue of “governance.”

In terms of history, it is obvious that the Sahel’s socio-political analysts have drastically overlooked and simplified the historical aspects of the matter. This lack of historical sense has prevented political actors from accurately appreciating and identifying the historical background of the prevailing predicament.

The Sahel, the historical birth region and a deposit belt for the ancient indigenous Sudanic civilizations, was at a certain point forced to twist its fate and go through a painful political face-lift process. In the medieval centuries, the region was forced to become a growing field for a number of quasi-Islamic kingdoms, empires, and sultanates, such as that of Bornu, Mali, and Songhai in the West; Wadai and Darfur in the center; and Sinnar in the East. This involuntary evolution, which resembled a kind of clash of civilizations, has affected and alienated the region’s natural individuation process and has set a state of confusion. This congenitally caused state of disorder has become a permanent characteristic of the region today. While this important background explains the emergence of the ongoing mushrooming of Islamic militant groups, the conviction of these militants and their aspirations is to repeat history. This state of affairs has further been reinforced by another similar experience that is more recent in time and more anti-western in stance. It is the Mahdist movement in the Sudan and the Dan Fodio Caliphate in West Africa. This accumulated heritage constitutes a strong background that explains the political root causes for the current Islamic extremist phenomena. These extremists also believe that they are, in part, battling to accomplish a historical duty of an incomplete mission.

On the other hand, the poorly arranged and minority elite-based patriarch regimes in the Sahel region have neither the necessary comprehension of the historical sense nor the requisite political will or stamina to effectively contain this major security threat.

In terms of geopolitics, the Sahel is an incredibly strategically important region that can severely impact both the North and South of Africa.
Additionally, the pertinent issue of governance is in dire needs of structural reformation in terms of strategy, actors, and mechanisms.

As these naturally corrupt minority elites dominate and abuse power, the major missing link is the absence of good governance that should embrace fundamental elements of popular, gender, and marginalized participation. This is the magical catalyzing factor that can help to redefine and re-equate the much-needed new paradigm shift.

Another area that requires a major paradigm shift is the security sector. The shift needed here requires a sector that is national in character and proportional in representation. But the most salient point in this scheme of arrangements that need a major policy shift is redefining the ambiguous and loosely defined concept of international partnership. The necessary redefinition would embrace the idea of international intervention, particularly in the humanitarian aspect. This would serve multiple purposes, including stopping humanitarian disasters and addressing mutual security arrangements. The rationale behind such a redefinition is propelled by the failure caused by corrupt minority elites, who have not only irredeemably failed to effect any meaningful structural changes in any of the Sahel’s respective experiences, but who have also played a role in sabotaging and obstructing any given popular-based attempt for the structural transformation process in the Sahel.

V. Conclusion
With the above anatomical diagnosis of the Sahel’s security conundrum, it is this writer’s considered view that a rational policy shift for the region should focus on a range of issues. First, there should be a focus on how to clearly and creatively define the needed New Security Order – a synchronized vigilance system that manages the trinity of freedoms, economic welfare, and safety of the citizens. Second, focus is needed on how to clearly identify priority areas for adjustment, of which humanitarian issues, employment, curriculum, freedoms, and the rule of law are of paramount importance. Third, there must be an identification of the new actors that are capable and energetic enough to carry out such policies, such as civil society, women, youth, and marginalized groups. Fourth, new mechanisms necessary for this scheme – such as an effective and representative parliament, a vibrant media and press, an independent judiciary, viable civil society, and a mandated, strong, and independent international oversight body, among others – must be established. Finally, there must be a scheduled timeframe involved for these shifts, including
prioritized short, medium, and strategic timeframes for reform.

Notes


2 Most notably, the Sahel region has included the civil wars in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, Mali, Nigeria, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone.


8 Including the United Nations/African Union in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and the Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).


10 Crocker and Laipson, “The Latest Front in a Long War.”


12 Michelot and Quencez, “Why the Sahel is Crucial to Europe’s Neighborhood – And Its Security Strategy.”


15 Dr. Jerome Tubiana, personal interview with author.

16 Rasheed Saeed, personal interview with author.

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Abstract
This article critically analyzes the popular metaphor of the “Development Ladder” within the theory of modernization. What assumptions underpin this metaphor and what problems are associated with the theory itself? I use the work of Sachs as a modern example of a text that relies extensively on the metaphor. I discuss the key assumptions informing the modernization theory and the metaphor of the Development Ladder. Next, I problematize the metaphor as rooted within modernization theory, discuss the assumptions of modernization theory, the implication of globalization on Africa and its relationship to the global market, and present and discuss the problems of historicity in development discourse.

I. Introduction
The debate in economics, and specifically in development studies, about how to move a society and its industries forward has a longstanding history. The colonial conquest was partly justified as bringing development, modernization, and civilization to the so-called “backward or primitive societies.” In 2005, Jeffrey Sachs, the director of The Earth Institute and a professor at Columbia University, published an influential book, The End of
Poverty. Sachs presents an account of poverty and development in terms of the metaphor of the “Development Ladder.” In his capacity as the Special Advisor to former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on the Millennium Development Goals, Sachs has advocated a particular brand of development economics in his quest to help end poverty, as the title of the book suggests.

This article critically analyzes the popular metaphor of the “Development Ladder” within the theory of modernization. What assumptions underpin this metaphor and what problems are associated with the theory itself? I use the work of Sachs as a modern example of a text that relies extensively on that metaphor. Secondly, I discuss the key assumptions informing modernization theory and the metaphor of the Development Ladder. Next, I problematize the metaphor as rooted within modernization theory, discuss the assumptions of modernization theory, the implication of globalization on Africa and its relationship to the global market, and present and discuss the problems of historicity in development discourse.

II. Sachs and Top-Down Reform
One of Sachs’ most preeminent critics is William Easterly, a professor of economics at New York University and co-director of the NYU Development Research Institute. Easterly wrote that Sachs was “the economics profession’s leading advocate of mega-reform. Whether it is stabilization of hyperinflation in Bolivia, shock therapy to leap from Communism to capitalism in Poland and Russia, or a ‘Big Push’ to end world poverty, Sachs’ recommendation throughout his career has been to do it fast, do it big, do it comprehensively, and do it with lots of Western money.”

In The End of Poverty, Sachs writes that “the rich have gotten rich because the poor have gotten poor,” more so, the key fact of our time is less driven by transfer of capital from one region to another but rather “the overall increase in world income, but at a different rate in different regions.” The relationship between the global South and the global North is not an issue according to this analysis. The institutional legacy of colonial rule, unequal relations between countries, and unfair treaties are all issues of the past for Sachs. Technology explains the gap between regions, according to his analysis. To end poverty, all we need is more aid money and donor contributions to help underdeveloped and developing countries get out of poverty by getting them moving up the ladder of development.

III. The ‘Development Ladder’ Metaphor and its Assumptions
The period between the First and Second World Wars and the decades of decolonization in Latin and South America, Southeast Asia, and Africa saw a debate between two economics schools; one advocating for state planning and the other championing markets. Karl Popper argued for “piecemeal democratic reform” as opposed to “utopian social engineering.” This is the intellectual legacy out of which Sachs situates his own arguments about the big push to end poverty, rooted within modernization theory. It builds on the debate between “therapy vs. gradualism in the ex-Communist countries.” The first major flaw with modernization theory, along with its metaphor of the Development Ladder, is that it dates back to the 1950s and 1960s and has long been abandoned by most economists “as simplistic, realizing that economic development is a complicated interplay of markets (with many imperfections), politics, social norms, institutions, and government policies, social services, and microeconomic interventions.” The second is its sequential approach; taking the state as a given unit of analysis, it forcefully imposes artificial stages upon people and the entire society without regard to the politics, history, norms, and values of those it seeks to move up the ladder. The third problem with the theory is that it naturalizes inequality within and between countries as a normal process toward growth and modernity.

Those who advocate a top-down approach and urge countries to get on the ladder of development usually take it upon themselves to justify the call by appealing to the problem of poverty and its eradication. Sachs writes in his book that “The end of poverty is at hand – within our generation – but only if we grasp the historic opportunity in front of us.” Behind this claim is an epistemological failure to distinguish between poverty as a historical fact and destitution, resulting from the type of relationship that undergirds the global economic order. Sachs conflates the two terms without making an effort to disentangle one from the other. As Ashis notes in his brilliant article, poverty has always been with us. Destitution, on the other hand, is “directly attributable to processes of development.” The myth in development discourse, then, is that poverty can be eradicated, when in reality destitution is a more accurate description. Modern critics such as Ashis and Lakshman Yapa locate the crisis at a deeper level, and they touch on the nature of discourse that upholds the discipline of development studies. Yapa, in one of his articles, noted that:

“The material deprivation experienced by the poor is a form of socially constructed scarcity. Poverty does not reside exclusively
in the external world independent of academic discourse that thinks about it; discourse is deeply implicated in creating poverty insofar as it conceals the social origins of scarcity. Although the experience of hunger and malnutrition is immediately material, ‘poverty’ exists in a discursive materialist formation where ideas, matter, discourse, and power are inter-twined in ways that virtually defy dissection.”

Part of the problem that economists are trying to solve is rooted in the discourse they produce about the problem. Without reforming that intellectual legacy, the technical solution, advanced by people like Sachs, will not eradicate poverty; instead, it will exacerbate already existing differences between and within countries.

Many studies that are critical of the nature of the relationship between western countries and formerly colonized societies are utterly absent from the account given by modernization theorists. It is this unequal relationship that has become problematic, given that inequality is on the rise around the world and income has been falling for the last four decades, especially in the United States. Moreover, the current global capitalist system prioritizes large increases in wealth and income, which is increasingly concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer people. The destruction of ecosystems and nature, and the many externalities that the system creates, are absent from modernization theory. The destruction of welfare in many regions of the world has not led to a redistribution of the benefits that the current system promises.

In other words, globalization has not benefited people equally everywhere. Wages have stagnated for middle classes around the world. As indicated by a report by the Economic Policy Institute, wages and income for the middle class have been on a decline since 1979 in the United States. This trend has contributed to “dismal wage growth” and is a “key contributor to income stagnation and growing income inequality.” Rather than critically analyze and engage with the factors that make and maintain an unequal relationship between and within countries, and interrogating the system that causes people to be worse off today than in the past, modernization theory fails to account for the complex sets of variables that enable poverty and destitution around the world.

IV. Globalization and Africa

Materially and intellectually, Africa has been reduced to an exporter of raw materials and a net importer of manufactured goods. This has resulted in the dwarfing of a competitive industrial base throughout the continent that would otherwise be
capable of elevating the standard of living for Africans, while deepening the continent’s reliance on external markets. The effect has been that developed countries have focused on manufacturing and knowledge-intensive sectors while allocating the task of raw material extraction to developing and underdeveloped countries. The effect has been a sustained system whereby the rich get richer and the poor are made poorer. The Egyptian economist Samir Amin notedly remarked that of all regions in the world, Africa remains the most vulnerable part of the global system and by this logic, it is condemned to perpetual exploitation.

Africa’s place in the world needs to be significantly renegotiated if it is to develop and strengthen its industrial powers. To escape the resource curse and current extreme dependence on diminishing-return industries such as natural resource extraction, African states will have to develop an alternative source of employment, an industrial base, and strengthen the productive powers of infant industries if those industries are to survive fierce international competition.

V. Historicity and Development Discourse

Friedrich List, the 19th-century German political economist, saw the state as the main instrument for economic progress. Through tariffs, subsidies, quotas, import bans on key raw materials, and rebates on industrial inputs, it provided enough coverage for domestic industries to develop their competitiveness. Erik Reinert, a Norwegian economist and a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of Strategic Studies, notes in his study of economic development since the Renaissance that “one very important task of the state has been to create well-functioning markets by providing a legal framework, standards, credit, physical infrastructure and if necessary to function temporarily as an entrepreneur of last resort.” The antagonism that is commonly reported in economic literature between the state and the private sector is rather a 20th-century phenomenon.

The very study of economic history has been systematically removed from curricula across the leading institutions in the United States. It is rare to find an economics department in the United States that has a flourishing study of economic history. Harvard University offers a case in point. The Russian economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron, speaking at Harvard University, noted that the study of economic history at Harvard was suffering the same fate as departments of physics in the total elimination of history from the academic curriculum; “such history has been shifted to an independent History of Science Department.” The effect of this crucial
omission from curricula is reflected in the failure of development economics to be properly grounded in history. Reinert has accused development economists of failing to properly contextualize and historicize the study of economics. Development efforts based on the dominant paradigm, which has abandoned the long tradition of economics dating back to the 1400s onward, ignored history and turned development economics into palliative economics. This is reflected in how development economists confuse symptoms of poverty with the causes of poverty, thus applying the wrong metrics to economic problems that affect developing countries. The effect of this failure in the study of history has been catastrophic for countries of the global South.

The next major problem is rooted within development economics and how it relates to history. The metaphor of the Development Ladder originated with the writings of the German political economist Friedrich List. In his seminal 1856 work, The National System of Political Economy, List made use of the metaphor in describing that what Great Britain, an imperial power then, was doing to other countries, namely Germany, amounted to a deliberate act of “kicking away the ladder” with which they climbed to the top, thus denying Germany the chance to develop its infant industries. However, the usage of the metaphor by modernization theorists skews the very history of how countries develop their industrial powers. By showing that there are set stages that all countries have to go through, modernization theory attempts to force countries into preset stages of development.

The great advocate of this approach long before Sachs was Walt Whitman Rostow and his Five Stage Growth Theory, which included: Traditional society; Pre-conditions to “take-off”; Take off; Drive to maturity; and Age of mass consumption. This was in essence like getting on the ladder of development, starting at the bottom, and climbing one step at a time, one stage at a time until a country reaches the apex of development, thus becoming “developed.”

VI. Conclusion
This short article has shown that modernization theory has been abandoned by serious economists in the field of development studies. Without a proper history of development, or historicizing the study of development, the lessons that are being prescribed to “underdeveloped countries, and developing countries” by modernization theorists present a mythical developmental ladder and stages of development, a highly sensitized development discourse stripped of history and a context that is outdated and out of touch with current realities. The outcome is as
discussed by Nina Munk on Sachs and his Millennium Villages. Those 12 sub-Saharan villages and the Utopian experiments being implemented there are a complete disaster and failure. The top-down approach advocated by modernization theorists, with its state-centric ideology, has only exacerbated existing differences within and between countries. Moreover, modernization theory, advocated by scholars like Sachs, has not led to poverty alleviation, let alone poverty eradication.

Notes
4 Sachs, The End of Poverty, 31.
8 Sachs, The End of Poverty, 41.
10 Easterly and Sachs, “The Big Push Déjà Vu.”
11 Easterly and Sachs, “The Big Push Déjà Vu.”
12 Sachs, The End of Poverty, 25.
21 The concept of diminishing and increasing
returns, popularized by the Norwegian econo-
mist Erik Reinert, is not new. It goes back to the
European Renaissance and finds expression
in the writings of many economists including
Friedrich List, National System of Political
Economy, trans. G.A. Matile (Philadelphia: J.
B. Lippincott & Co., 1856). Alfred Marshall,
Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan,
1890), and in American statements attributed
to policymakers such as Abraham Lincoln,
Alexander Hamilton, and Erik S. Reinert,
“Development and Social Goals: Balancing
Aid and Development to Prevent ‘Welfare Co-
lonialism’” (Paper Prepared for the High-Level
United Nations Development Conference
on Millennium Development Goals, New
York, March 14 and 15, 2005),” (Oslo, Norway
& Tallinn, Estonia, 2005). These concepts are
rooted in economic theory that deals with the
process that leads to growth or lack thereof.

22 Christopher Zambakari, “Underdevelopment
and Economic Theory of Growth: Case for
Infant Industry Promotion,” Consilience - The
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23 Erik S. Reinert, “The Role of the State in
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24 Alexander Gerschenkron, “History of Eco-
nomic Doctrines and Economic History,” The


26 Friedrich List, National System of Political
Economy, trans. G.A. Matile (Philadelphia: J.
B. Lippincott & Co., 1856).

27 Ha-Joon Chang, “The Dangers of Reducing
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28 See Ch. 2 of W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Eco-
nomic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto
(Cambridge, UK: [Cambridge] University

29 Nina Munk, The Idealist: Jeffrey Sachs and
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Feature

Quintessence of Macroeconomic Uncertainty in the DR Congo

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Abstract
Since 2015, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), a major rent-based economy in Africa, has experienced macroeconomic turbulence with significant inflationary pressures and a severe exchange rate depression, partly due to a commodities slump. The economic downturn has contributed to strengthening the acute social crisis. The country is a fragile state on the edge, a product of the postponement of the 2016 presidential elections. Altogether, the country’s socioeco-
nomic governance is in jeopardy. This paper proposes to examine the root causes of macroeconomic uncertainty in the DR Congo. It investigates how uncertainty has generated a negative impact on key macroeconomic indicators, including the real GDP growth rate and inflation. The main features of the country’s economy are assessed on a basis of the Central Bank of Congo and International Monetary Fund (IMF) data. The findings reveal that uncertainty is strongly related to commodity prices’ volatility. On the domestic front, sustained macroeconomic uncertainty is further stimulated by political instability, combined with rising insecurity in the eastern and western provinces. Overall, external and internal shocks have affected the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy.

As a result, the government’s margins of maneuver are extremely reduced. As part of crisis recovery strategies, a critical policy recommendation suggests the implementation of the political agreement of 31 December 2016, which was negotiated between the ruling party and the opposition, to resolve the current political impasse.

Introduction
Despite its rich endowment of natural resources, the DR Congo remains primarily a commodity export economy. After the end of the Second Congolese War (1998-2003), the donor community gradually cooperated with the DR Congo. From 2004 to 2014, the country experienced relative macroeconomic stability. In 2015, its economic resilience deteriorated. Since then, the country has been going through major macroeconomic turbulence.

First, the paper examines the country’s fragile economic resilience, as its economic performance is closely tied to the fluctuation of commodities prices.

Second, the paper reviews key features of the economic downturn. It refers to macroeconomic developments covering December 2014 to August 2017. Given macroeconomic imbalances, it analyzes a set of measures elaborated by the Congolese authorities and the Central Bank of Congo (BCC) to reinforce macroeconomic policies’ coordination in a highly dollarized economy.

Third, the paper identifies political turmoil and security concerns as major contributing factors to macroeconomic uncertainty in the DR Congo. In response, an inclusive mediation process was initiated to restore relative political stability. As a result, the 31 December 2016 agreement was concluded. Nonetheless, it was not implemented in a timely manner. It did not lay the foundation for a peaceful political transition. Consequently, political uncertainty
puts macroeconomic developments in the DR Congo further in jeopardy.

1. The DR Congo: A Fragile Economic Resilience
About 10 percent and 30 percent of the world’s copper and cobalt reserves, respectively, are concentrated in the DR Congo’s former province of Katanga, in south-eastern DR Congo. Its economy heavily depends on the exports of the above-mentioned commodities. Therefore, it remains extremely vulnerable to external shocks, including drops in global commodity prices in 2007 and 2015. These shocks entailed macroeconomic disorders.

1.1. From the Impact of the International Financial Crisis to the Commodities Slump
In 2007, the global financial crisis generated a depression in commodity markets. The DR Congo experienced a severe mining crisis, notably in the copper-cobalt belt of the former province of Katanga. Beyond a drastic reduction of export revenues, the crisis negatively impacted the country’s economy.

As of 2015, a second mining crisis occurred in the DR Congo, resulting from a drop in global commodity prices. In terms of trade balance, the country’s exports dropped from USD 12,321,149,335.84 to USD 10,284,716,897.59 from 2014 to 2015. In 2015, mineral and oil exports corresponded to 97.5 percent of the country’s total export value. Mineral exports included copper, cobalt, and zinc from Gecamines and partners operating in the above-mentioned copper-cobalt belt. They represented 80.7 percent of the country’s total export value (Figure 1).

In 2015, China was the biggest trade partner of the country. The geopolitics of copper and cobalt led China to strengthen its economic partnership with the DR Congo. In addition to the Sino-Congolese mining deal of 2007, it increased its presence in the country, through major mining acquisitions over the last decade. Macroeconomic developments in China will continue to impact the Congolese economy.

Overall, improving governance of the extractive sector remains a prerequisite. The sector is a major
source of the country’s growth potential. This promises to improve the legal framework pertaining to the business environment, including the long-overdue review of the 2002 mining code. Additionally, the DR Congo has to engage in economic diversification by developing the agribusiness sector, which will require the implementation of structural reforms. It is confronted with a deficit in infrastructure (transportation and energy supplies) despite its strategic location in central Africa. The aforementioned reforms will enable the DR Congo to move towards sustainable economic development and poverty alleviation.

1.2. Aftermath of Commodity Price Volatility in the DR Congo

From 2004 to 2007, the real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate slightly decreased from 6.6 percent to 6.3 percent, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). From 2008 to 2009, it fell from 6.2 percent to 2.9 percent, owing to the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007. As a result, the country entered its first recession in September 2008.

Nevertheless, from 2010 to 2013, real GDP growth rose from 7.1 percent to 8.5 percent. In 2014, it was estimated at 9.2 percent, which was the third-fastest growth rate in the world. The primary sector (40.6 percent of GDP), including the extractive industries (22 percent of GDP), the secondary sector (20.9 percent), and the tertiary sector (31 percent of GDP), drove the economic growth.

Overall, the DR Congo experienced relative macroeconomic stability from 2004 to 2014, although it was confronted with an acute social crisis combined with a longstanding humanitarian crisis throughout the country.

As of mid-2015, the country was severely impacted by a drop in prices of its major export commodities due to China’s economic slowdown. The commodities slump revealed the first warning signs of the economic downturn. The real GDP growth rate declined from 6.9 percent to 2.4 percent from 2015 to 2016.

Real GDP growth was projected at 2.8 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively, in 2017 and 2018 (Figure 2). The DR Congo could potentially achieve these projections given the positive trend observed in commodities markets. The development of clean energy technologies, including the dynamic electric car market, has contributed to a higher demand for copper, cobalt, and lithium. However, the realization of the said projections will depend on the future of the political regime.

Figure 2. Evolution of Real GDP Growth Rates in the DR Congo and Sub-Saharan Africa from 2004 to 2018
2. A Dollarized Economy in a Tailspin During Political Transition

Since 2015, efforts to extend the unstable political regime have plunged the country into yet another political transition since its independence in 1960. This has contributed to a worsening of the country’s macroeconomic developments. Since then, successive governments and the BCC have tried to implement measures to curb negative economic and financial trends. However, this leads to questions regarding the ability of Congolese authorities and policymakers to improve the country’s economic governance amid the political turmoil.

2.1. Unprecedented Pressures on Monetary Policy

The country’s economy has entered a zone of turbulence. Its vulnerability to external shocks has precipitated increasing inflationary pressures. It has also entailed a crisis of confidence in the national currency. In these circumstances, the central bank plays a critical role. It is committed to reducing inflation and defending the national currency by conducting a restrictive monetary policy. However, enforcing its mandate is a complex prospect in a highly dollarized economy facing an uncertain political transition.

2.1.1. The DR Congo Renewing the Inflationary Spiral

From 31 December 2014 to 29 June 2016, the annual inflation rate increased from 1.26 percent to 3.44 percent. From 29 July to 31 December 2016, it soared from 6.5 percent to 25.04 percent, regardless of the first set of the government’s measures having been implemented on 28 January 2016. On 31 January 2017, it spiked to 119.13 percent, the highest rate in eight years. From 28 February to 16 July 2017, annual inflation slightly decreased, from 75.13 percent to 73.23 percent, although it remained above 50 percent (see Figure 3). Regardless of its agricultural potential, the DR Congo is a major importer of food products, which continues to fuel inflationary pressures. Altogether, it
has experienced hyperinflation, which is, to a lesser extent, a reminder of Zaire’s hyperinflation crisis, which occurred from 1990 to 1996. Besides the external shocks, the main causes of the hyperinflation are political in nature. Rising political instability was exclusively derived from the over-delayed presidential elections.

Figure 3. Evolution of the Annual Inflation Rate in the DR Congo from December 2014 to July 2017

![Graph](image)

*(Source: The author, on the basis of the Central Bank of Congo.)*

*To 23 July 2017.*

2.1.2. Crisis of Confidence in the Congolese Franc
The inflationary spiral has put pressure on the official exchange rate of the freely floating Congolese franc (CDF) against the US dollar (USD). From 31 December 2015 to 30 December 2016, the Congolese franc depreciated against the USD, from CDF 927.92 per USD 1 to CDF 1,215.59 per USD, corresponding to a 31 percent monetary depreciation. From 31 January 2017, the national currency depreciated from CDF 1,277.7 per USD to reach CDF 1,647.80 per USD by the end of July 2017, or a depreciation of 28.96 percent in six months (Figure 4). As a result, Congolese households’ purchasing power continued to drop. This led to mounting social tension, including repeated calls for strikes. The Congolese currency’s depreciation damaged economic operators’ confidence. A higher country risk resulted from a deterioration of the business climate. Since the end of July 2017, the Congolese currency has timidly appreciated against the American currency. On 11 August 2017, it traded at a rate of CDF 1,500.56 / USD 1.

Figure 4. Evolution of the Official Exchange Rate from December 2014 to August 2017*

*(Source: The author, on the basis of the Central Bank of Congo.)*

*To 23 July 2017.*
2.1.3. Critical Threshold of International Reserves

The Congolese franc has lost considerable value against the USD. This also showed difficulties that the BCC faced in maintaining its international reserves. From December 2014 to June 2016, the central bank’s gross international reserves decreased from USD 1,644.48 million to USD 1,091.28 million, mainly owing to a drop in exports of commodities. From 30 September to 30 December 2016, they continued to fall, from USD 928.24 million to USD 852.14 million, corresponding to 3.76 weeks’ worth of imports. On 30 September 2016, they amounted to USD 928.24 million. On 20 July 2017, they were only estimated at USD 693.80 million or 3.05 weeks’ worth of imports (Figure 5).

On 17 July 2017, the central bank requested the enforcement of a measure related to the repatriation of at least 40 percent of mining companies’ revenues from mineral exports, to lessen the shortage of foreign exchange. The non-compliance of the said measure will generate penalties. Alone, the implementation of this measure will be insufficient to mitigate the erosion of the BCC’s gross international reserves. The crisis of confidence in the Congolese franc has undermined its central bank’s credibility.

Figure 5. Evolution of International Reserves from December 2014 to July 2017*
2.1.4. The Central Bank under Scrutiny
In principle, Law Number 005/2002 of 7 May 2002 granted the central bank’s independence in order to depoliticize the conduct of monetary policy and achieve price stability. Under the impulse of the monetary policy committee, the BCC has tried to immediately respond to the continued deterioration of the country’s macroeconomic framework since 2015.

On 28 September 2016, the monetary institution raised its principal interest rate from 5 percent to 7 percent. On 26 June 2017, it continued to increase the said rate from 14 percent to 20 percent, to halt a drop in foreign reserves and the severe depreciation of the national currency against the American currency. Second, the central bank has used its own liquidity management tool, known as the “Billets de Trésorerie” (BTR), to regulate base money. Since 2016, the exchange rate has remained volatile, despite several foreign exchange auctions to extract liquidity.

In practice, the central bank has faced tremendous difficulties in attempting to tighten its monetary policy. Over the years, it has lost control over monetary policy instruments in a highly dollarized economy. In mid-1990 and 2001, the dollarization ratio was estimated at 90 percent and 75 percent, respectively. In 2014, the dollarization process was estimated at 85 percent of total deposits in USD in banks and 174 percent of gross international reserves. As a result, the effectiveness of the BCC’s monetary policy is extremely restricted. Also, the BCC has operated in a fragile state, characterized by weak institutions.

2.2. Public Finance in Crisis
As the country degenerated into political turmoil in 2015, successive governments have undermined the central bank’s independence by implementing unsustainable fiscal policies. A lack of coordination of monetary and fiscal policies showed that fiscal policy became dominant over monetary policy. The central bank was constrained to monetize budget deficits.

2.2.1. Concerns over Conduct of Fiscal Policy
In 2014, the country recorded a budget surplus amounting to USD 44,259,277.15. Since 2015, a sharp drop in commodities prices has negatively impacted public finance. In 2015, the annual budget deficit was USD 506,372,167. In early 2016, the government implemented 28 emergency measures to address macroeconomic imbalances. However, these measures were insufficient. As a result, on 4 May 2016, the government revised the 2016 state budget, from USD 9,080,681,622 to USD
6,800,000,000, given its limited capacity to mobilize domestic revenue. The initial state budget, which was cut by 22 percent, was promulgated on 29 June 2016.

On 24 October 2016, the then government submitted the 2017 draft state budget of USD 4,500,000,000 to the national assembly. The examination of the said draft budget was suspended, while the country experienced rising political turmoil.

At the end of 2016, the annual budget deficit increased by USD 200,264,449.9. Budget slippages mainly resulted from a tense political situation, coupled with growing security concerns in the eastern provinces and in the Kasaï region. Also, they revealed a weakness in terms of expenditure management procedure, notably the expenditure chain. In this context, the central bank acknowledged that it monetized budget deficits, which increased monetary supply. Also, this contributed to fueling continued monetary depreciation associated with an inflationary spiral. Since the country’s independence in June 1960, government deficits have often been financed through money creation, particularly during political instability, and in particular under the Mobutu regime.

As of 1 January 2017, the country officially embarked on a political transition, as stipulated in the political agreement dated 31 December 2016. Delays in examining the 2017 state budget entailed executing the provisional credits on a monthly basis. Following the installment of the transitional government, a revised 2017 draft state budget was resubmitted to the Parliament. On 29 June 2017, President Kabila promulgated the 2017 state budget of USD 7,935,641,209.56, with a six-month delay. Key budgetary priorities focused on funding the electoral cycle and sovereignty-related spending, owing to the security crisis in the eastern provinces and the Kasaï region.

From 1 January 2016 to 27 July 2017, the transitional government attempted to restore a fragile fiscal discipline. It limited public expenditures, without necessarily strengthening public spending tracking. Also, it delayed the execution of public spending, including civil servants’ salaries (Figure 6). Such decisions have increased social tensions in a country already confronted with an acute social crisis. Moreover, the unexpected public spending related to the electoral process and insecurity constitutes a serious matter of concern. To prevent budgetary slippages, a strict monitoring of public finance will be critical during the transitional period leading up to the next elections.

Figure 6. Execution of the State Budgets and the Provisional Credits from 2014 to July 2017
Furthermore, the transitional government is committed to raising public revenues. On 12 August 2017, it temporarily suspended a value-added tax (VAT) exemption on imports for mining companies operating in the country. It plans to improve domestic revenue mobilization (DRM) by increasing its tax base. This will require key structural reforms, which will be governance challenges. These reforms comprise: (i) rebuilding fiscal institutions (tax and customs administrations) at the national and provincial levels; (ii) fighting against illicit financial flows; and (iii) proceeding to the country’s economic diversification.

2.2.2. The DR Congo: In Search of Donor Assistance
In the aftermath of the commodities slump in 2015-16, some rent-based economies, including Nigeria and Suriname, requested the IMF’s financial assistance. The DR Congo’s last three-year economic program with the IMF ended in December 2012. Since then, the IMF has maintained a policy dialogue and technical assistance with the country. In 2015, the IMF and the DR Congo restarted official discussions for a new economic program under Article 4, wherein the country has entered into a deep economic crisis. Finally, on 12 June 2017, the transitional government sought financial assistance from the IMF under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) to deal with an urgent balance of payments need amid a critical political impasse. In response, on 29 June 2017, the IMF conditioned financial support under tangible political progress. An IMF delegation was expected to visit the country to assess the economic situation as of mid-September 2017. It could be challenging for the IMF and the DR Congo to conclude a new economic program, given mounting political uncertainty. It is worth noting that, in 2009, the country received the IMF’s assistance to address the impact of the international financial crisis on the balance of payment and to stabilize the national currency. Overall, the DR Congo has regularly called upon the Bretton Woods institutions, including...
3. Economy in Jeopardy: Focus on Political and Security Factors

A deficit in institution-building and the restoration of state authority both constitute internal shocks. These shocks fueled macroeconomic uncertainty in the DR Congo. First, the end of Mobutu’s political regime generated several years of conflict. From 2003 to 2014, the DR Congo engaged in efforts towards building a legitimate state apparatus with donors’ support. Then, the 2006 and 2011 presidential elections legitimated the emerging political regime. In 2015, the political landscape gradually deteriorated in the run-up to a new electoral cycle. Nevertheless, the postponement of the 2016 presidential elections entailed a political impasse. Second, the DR Congo remains confronted with the restoration of state authority. A major security crisis spread throughout the country.

3.1. Attempts at Solving the Political Impasse in the DR Congo on the Edge

In 2015, the DR Congo experienced its first major political crisis since the Second Congolese War of 1998-2003. A year later, the African Union (AU) and the Congolese Catholic Church (CENCO) launched two international and national mediation processes. However, these initiatives did not record major political progress.

3.1.1. The DR Congo Facing Political and Electoral Crises

The electoral crisis combined with the constitutional crisis has resulted in political turmoil. Referring to the constitutional court decision dated 11 May 2016, President Kabila will remain in office until the installation of the newly-elected president. In September 2016, the AU led the first national mediation in hopes to defuse warning signs of a political crisis. On 18 October 2016, the AU-facilitated agreement authorized a delay in the 2016 presidential election until April 2018. The opposition contested the agreement, considering that President Joseph Kabila’s second term and last mandate ended on 19 December 2016. A worsening political situation created widespread violence.

On 8 December 2016, the CENCO conducted a second mediation process including the ruling party and the opposition. On 31 December 2016, it concluded with an agreement providing an institutional framework during the political transition. According to said agreement, President Kabila would remain in office until 31 December 2017. Meanwhile, the provincial, national, and presidential elections would take place no later than 31 December 2017. The tran-
sitional government’s installment would ensure national cohesion. All institutions would continue their mandates on an interim basis. A Conseil National de Suivi de l’Accord (CNSA), an oversight institution, would also be set up to monitor the implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement. Beyond the aforementioned agreement, the main challenges would consist of building trust in the electoral process during the transition.


The opposition, the CENCO, and the donor community, including the United Nations (UN) and the Council of the European Union (EU), repeatedly called for action to comply with and fully implement the 31 December 2016 agreement. Given a political ownership deficiency related to the implementation of the said agreement, on 27 March 2017, the CENCO withdrew its involvement from mediation efforts. So far, the major milestones are as follows:

- On 7 April 2017, President Kabila appointed Mr. Bruno Tshibala as prime minister during the political transition. On 9 May 2017, the Tshibala government was mainly comprised of ministers and members of the ruling party.
- On 25 July 2017, the transitional government appointed Mr. Joseph Olenga, the chair of the CNSA, and other CNSA members. The opposition and civil society, however, contested the CNSA presidency, revealing a strong political defiance.

In preparation for the presidential elections, in August 2017, the Congolese Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) continued voter enrollment in the tumultuous Kasaï region.

Beyond voter registration, the presidential election’s timetable is a major concern. The UN, the EU, the CENCO, and the opposition called for holding the presidential elections no later than 31 December 2017, in line with the 31 December 2016 agreement. On 7 July 2017, the CENI announced that the presidential elections would not take place in 2017, given that the Kasaï region was in crisis. The ruling party and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) supported the CENI’s decision, while the opposition and the donor community denounced it. On 10 July 2017, the CENCO consulted with the transitional government, the CENI, and the CNSA to decide on the future of the presidential election organization. The late publication of the electoral calendar crystallized rising political tensions. The 31 December 2016 agreement did not lay the foundation for a peaceful political transition. The prolonged political crisis shows how the derailment of
the 31 December 2016 agreement could jeopardize donors’ confidence, including the IMF.

Finally, on 5 November 2017, the CENI announced the organization of the presidential, legislative, and provincial elections on 23 December 2018. The swearing-in ceremony of the president-elect will take place on 12 January 2019. The opposition largely rejected the electoral calendar. This has sparked another spiral of violence in various cities, such as Goma, Lubumbashi, Kindu, and Beni. Since 2015, the country has regularly witnessed large-scale violence due to the political crises resulting from the electoral crises.

Overall, political uncertainty keeps deepening, along with waves of violent demonstrations throughout the country. There is high risk of a postponement of the presidential elections. The DR Congo has never experienced a peaceful transfer of power since its independence in 1960.

3.2. Rising Insecurity in the DR Congo in Crisis

In connection with political regime instability, the DR Congo has recorded critical security challenges in the eastern DR Congo, particularly in five provinces (North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Ituri, and Tanganyika). Furthermore, widespread violence has emerged in the western DR Congo, comprising six provinces of the Kasaï region (Kasaï, Kasaï Central, Kasaï Oriental, Lomami, Sankuru, and Kwilu), since August 2016.

3.2.1. A Longstanding Security Crisis in Eastern DR Congo

Since June 2003, the DR Congo has made some progress in the economic reunification process. It has embarked on a transition from a war economy to a peace economy, except in the eastern provinces. It is committed to pacifying the eastern side of the country with the assistance of the donor community. Over the last decade, the national army, the so-called Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and the UN peacekeeping mission have launched a series of joint military operations against militias, including Rudia II in South Irumu, Iron Stone, Umoja Wetu, and Kimia II, to restore the state’s authority. Nonetheless, insecurity still prevails in eastern DR Congo, notably Beni (North Kivu) and Kalemie (Tanganyika province). It has put heavy pressure on public finance over the years.

3.2.2. Emergence of Insecurity in Western DR Congo: From the Kasaï Region and Other Western Provinces

As of August 2016, a major security crisis has erupted in the Kasaï region under the impulse of militias, such as the Kamuina Nsapu, the Bana
Mura, and the FARDC. A year later, volatile security situations still persist as militias are not yet dismantled. The Kasaï in crisis has generated a major humanitarian crisis, combined with a migration crisis. As a result, 1.3 million people were internally displaced from April to 22 June 2017. Moreover, acts of violence have been observed in other western provinces, such as Matadi (Kongo Central province) and Kinshasa, in 2017. They entailed a surge in sovereignty-related spending.

**Conclusion and Policy Implications**

Major risks to the country’s economic outlook for 2018 are closely associated with uncertainty due to a multidimensional crisis. The transitional government is, therefore, exposed to higher macroeconomic risks. Although its margins of maneuver are extremely reduced, its priority consists in restoring fiscal discipline. In this connection, the central bank should preserve its independence to conduct a monetary policy in a highly dollarized economy.

The DR Congo has the potential to become a driving force in terms of regional growth. In this context, its economy could benefit from a surge in prices observed in key commodities markets, such as cobalt and copper. Macroeconomic stabilization closely depends on the country’s political landscape. Nonetheless, a chronic deficit in institution-building and the restoration of the state’s authority in the eastern provinces and the Kasaï region constitute major obstacles to the country’s economic resilience.

Beyond the publication of the electoral calendar in November 2017, a critical policy recommendation might suggest reviewing the political agreement of 31 December 2016 to resolve the current political impasse. Moving towards a sustainable political stability is a key prerequisite for sustained growth and inclusive development.

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**Notes**

1. In 2015, Katanga was divided into the following provinces: Haut-Lomami, Haut-Katanga, Tanganyika, and Lualaba.
4. On 17 September 2007, the DR Congo and a consortium of private Chinese companies (China Railway Engineering Company (CREC), SinoHydro Corporation, and Zhejiang Huayou Colbalt Co. Ltd.) signed a deal for USD 9.5 million, covering the infrastructure and mining sectors. The IMF criticized the Sino-Congolese agreement due to the government-guaranteed infrastructure financing, which could increase the country’s external debt burden over the medium term. In October 2009, the deal was revised. It was reduced to USD 6 billion to be compatible
with debt sustainability.


6 As of December 2012, the review of the 2002 mining code started with donors’ assistance. In March 2015, the draft of the mining law was submitted to the Parliament. However, the commodities slump suspended the examination process. In May 2017, a revised draft of the mining law was submitted to the Parliament.

7 This also includes improving the management of state assets through an efficient public-sector enterprises (PSE) reform.


14 In July 2017, trade-unionist civil servants called for strikes in the country, denouncing their purchasing power’s erosion. On 20 July 2017, Prime Minister Tshibala agreed to increase civil servants’ wages following the Council of Ministers’ approval. Although such an agreement will decrease social tensions, it will put additional pressure on public finances. It is worth noting that some strikes occurred, particularly at Kinshasa’s university. Other civil servants, including teachers, went on strike on 4 September 2017.

15 In June 2017, enterprises paid fiscal taxes in Congolese francs, which also contributed to the appreciation of this currency.


17 “La BCC somme les entreprises minières de


30 The late promulgation of the state budget has affected the preparation of the presidential elections.


32 Since 2017, the pressure has been increased for extractive companies, which do not create favorable environments for private-sector development. From 29-30 August 2017, the transitional government organized a conference in view of improving the country’s legal framework for investors.

33 Laure Gnassou, “Financing Sustainable Development in Fragile States: The Case of the DR Congo,” (paper presented at The
In 2008, the IMF and the DR Congo started discussions on an economic program, known as PEG II, covering 2009-11. On 11 December 2009, the IMF board approved the three-year arrangement of USD 551.45 million for the DR Congo under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) program.


From 30 December 2008 to 27 February 2009, the central bank’s gross international reserves decreased from USD 77 million to USD 32.87 million. The country was virtually bankrupt. On 12 March 2009, the IMF provided USD 195 million under the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF). As a result, the central bank’s international reserves rose from USD 237.29 million to USD 894 million from 31 March 2009 to 30 September 2009. In February 2009, the World Bank provided a USD 100 million emergency loan to soften the impact of the global recession.


The DR Congo has experienced several political transitions, including at the end of the second republic under the Mobutu regime.


A New Face of the State: The Role of Telecom Providers in African Politics

Abstract
African states are increasingly leveraging the power of telecom operators to advance goals that the state itself struggles to secure (e.g. security and fiscal goals). This suggests a paradigmatic shift in African politics, whereby telecom operators have become a face of the state, exerting agency over state and citizen in pervasive and sometimes unexpected ways. However, their structural implications for African politics are lamentably under-theorized. Inspired by Marshall McLuhan’s maxim, “the medium is the message,” this paper examines MTN’s operations in Nigeria and Rwanda to expose the double-edged nature of this new structural dynamic.
“Everywhere you go,” boasts the slogan of South African telecom giant MTN, a testament to its 232 million subscribers in 18 African markets.¹ A powerful force on the continent, telecom providers offer transformative communication services to state and citizen alike. However, their pervasive reach calls into question the structural values embedded within these private actors, and the ensuing implications for African politics. It is therefore important to examine the oft-obfuscated structural changes that accompany the advent of new technology, rather than solely focusing on the tangible consequences of its implementation. Indeed, the maxim of the late Canadian philosopher, Marshall McLuhan, states that “the medium is the message,” thereby acknowledging that the characteristics of anything that is created (the medium) can be understood through the changes – either implicit or explicit – they effect (the message). Warning that the content of the medium “blinds us to the character of the medium,” the message thereby represents a mode of distraction away from the potent effect of the medium itself.

McLuhan’s adage resonates with the study of African politics for, as this paper argues, mobile telecommunications operators (“telecom providers”) represent a new force in African politics. The actors providing telecom services (the medium) have significant repercussions for how the citizen engages with the state, establishing a need to move beyond the tangible message (digital communication capabilities) and examine their larger structural implications for African politics. Moreover, the pervasive reach and dependence associated with telecom providers suggests that they “are more than transmitters of content, they represent cultural ambitions, political machineries … and, in certain ways, the economy and spirit of an age.” Thus, this paper considers digital media as those actors who enable access: telecom providers. As the ultimate arbiters of providing the capital and infrastructure to construct these channels of communication, they require analysis to examine the implications of their emergence for African politics, respectively defined as the arenas within which citizens engage with the state.

The paper commences with an overview of the continent’s telecom landscape, followed by a historicizing analysis of communication infrastructures for broadcasting state power. To situate the argument that telecom providers represent a novel form of corporate actor that informs how citizens engage with the state, the paper explores Nigeria and Rwanda’s harnessing of South African telecom giant MTN to advance state goals. The political implications of these state-led yet corporate-implemented
logics highlight the strong dependency of both state and citizen on telecom providers, casting them as a face of the state. This suggests a paradigmatic shift in African politics whereby telecom providers are deeply intertwined with the state, yet also exert their own agency over state and citizen in pervasive and sometimes unexpected ways.

Why Focus on the Corporate Actor?

This paper treats the corporate actor—specifically, telecom providers—as the key variable of analysis. However, the structural and political role of telecom providers is remarkably under-theorized in political economy examinations of information communication technologies (ICTs) in African states. While a burgeoning literature analyzes the impact of social media on African politics, minimal work has explored the political influence of the medium that offers citizens these services. Although Obadare explores Nigerian citizens protesting telecom providers’ high tariffs, the article predominantly concerns the relationship between protestors and telecom providers, rather than the relationship between telecom providers and the state. This lacuna requires addressing, because corporate actors can considerably affect the crafting of regulation and political practices in Africa. For example, industry-led voluntary initiatives in Africa’s mining sector have seen regulatory decisions shift from the state to the corporate sphere, a phenomenon defined as private authority. Although this paper does not assume that state and citizen reliance on telecom providers presupposes diminished state sovereignty, it nevertheless treats telecom providers as a novel form of corporate actor, requiring analysis to examine the socio-political contours that accompany their existence.

Further underscoring the need to examine the corporate actor, Africa’s telecom industry is dominated by the private sector (save Ethiopia). Although many African states maintain a monopoly on fixed-line telephony services, penetration is low as infrastructure provision is both sporadic and expensive. By contrast, wireless mobile services require comparatively lower capital expenditure per user and are driven by multinational telecom providers. Historical logics help account for this wealth of private actors. A constitutive element of neoliberal policy prescriptions under World Bank structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines, African states seeking financing were required to liberalize their economies and privatize state monopolies. Consequently, private telecom providers were licensed to provide telephony services that were once under the
purview of the state.

Accusations of economic imperialism have been levied against multinational corporations’ (MNCs) deep penetration in the African telecom market. Ya’u argues that the WTO’s aim for telecom MNCs is to “secure the virgin markets of [developing states] and configure the world in the interest of new imperial powers.” These accusations merit investigation, particularly due to the asymmetrical capital differentials exhibited between foreign corporations and African states. As shown in Figure 1, South African telecom giant MTN had global revenues of $11.35 billion in 2015, exceeding the GDP of eight of its 18 African markets. Thus, we should explore how these powerful actors engage with the state, and the ensuing implications for African politics.

*Source: World Bank and MTN figures.*

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**Historicizing Communication Technologies**

The state’s use of communication infrastructures to broadcast power was not always so deeply intertwined with corporate actors. In preparation for analyzing the contemporary era of private telecom providers, it is therefore necessary to examine communication technologies in the colonial and post-colonial eras. Although this approach belies Cooper’s claim that African history should be viewed fluidly, rather than demarked into colonial and post-colonial camps, the limited length of this paper renders Africa’s colonial era a feasible heuristic starting point.

European colonial powers transformed pre-colonial African states through centralized, export-oriented logics. To extend their rule, colonial authorities needed to establish order through bureaucratization while also pacifying peripheral areas. However,
Africa’s dispersed and ethnically-distinct populations challenged colonial authorities’ centralizing ambitions. To conquer these difficult demographics, “modernizing” communication infrastructures were developed to broadcast state power; the novel innovations of the “telegraph and radio tied the superstructure together into a grid of domination [that was] not available in earlier centuries.” Although Herbst discounts the importance of communication for extending the reach of the state, he nevertheless concedes that infrastructure permitted the colonial state “to reach outward but also allow those in the hinterland to march more quickly to the center of power.” Communication networks were also seized for “civilizing” ambitions. Illustrating the representational power of colonial-era technological projects, Larkin notes that British colonial administrators in Nigeria adopted radio as a vehicle to craft subjects into developed, modern citizens. However, the reflexive and subversive potential of communication networks also made transnational radio an ideal vehicle to disseminate subversive anti-colonial sentiments. For example, Egypt’s Radio Cairo broadcast anti-colonial programmes to British-ruled East Africa, mobilizing liberation movements.

Post-colonial governments inherited these communication networks and swiftly transformed them into a vehicle to disseminate a singular state-led narrative. Although the territorial sovereignty of African states’ colonially-constructed boundaries decreased inter-state warfare – a departure from European experiences, where continuous aggression for trade and space made war inevitable – African states extended their power to prevent internal threats. Having experienced themselves the subversive power of radio during their liberation struggles, post-colonial states stifled communication channels that challenged their state-building initiatives.

The state’s monopolization of information dissemination alludes to Cooper’s notion that post-colonial states serve a constraining “gate-keeper” function. This practice was predominantly “top-down,” with little available recourse from subject populations because like “the radio, the newspaper is a medium better suited to sending messages than to receiving them.” Indeed, radio offers an attractive vehicle to disseminate the contours of state policy. Attesting to the importance of monopolizing communication mechanisms to broadcast state power, establishing control over state-owned radio was a preoccupation for militaries attempting coups across the continent. Radio was also used to propagate social ambitions. For example, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere embraced communication technologies to advance his
compulsory *ujamaa* “villagization” policy. Due to the extensive reach of radio broadcasts, Nyerere launched *ujamaa* via Tanzania’s state-owned radio station, and extolled its quantitative achievements through government-owned newspapers. Further alluding to McLuhan’s argument that one should examine the *medium* to understand the *message*, communication infrastructures represent “the institutionalized networks that facilitate the flow of goods in a wider cultural as well as physical sense.” A veneer of modernity accompanied the state’s harnessing of communication technologies to pursue state goals, both a nod to cosmopolitanism and an entrenchment of post-colonial states’ new position in the world. In this way, state-led communication mechanisms were inextricably linked with how citizens experienced the state.

Resistive practices emerged to counter these “top-down” state-broadcasting phenomena. Bayart challenges the notion that the state enjoyed a monopoly on crafting a singular narrative by arguing that “the state does not exist beyond the uses made of it by all social groups, including the most subordinate.” Invoking notions of *Radio-Trottoir* (pavement radio) and *Radio-Couloir* (corridor radio), he addresses the limits of the state’s extension of power vis-à-vis communication infrastructure. These informal word-of-mouth networks countered the dominant narrative, allowing citizens to “insolently ignore the embargoes of the censors and obstruct the totalitarian designs of the government … with their black humor.” Although radio and newspapers were invariably one-way instruments, Bayart’s subversive “*Radios*” underscore that citizens could deconstruct and repurpose these narratives, challenging post-colonial states’ centralizing logics.

However, the liberalization of communications infrastructure under SAP prescriptions fomented a stark departure from the state-monopolized communications nexus, and it is to the implications of this change for African politics that we now turn.

**A Novel Form of Corporate Actor**

The argument that telecom providers represent a new force for African politics rests on two assumptions. First is the notion of *intimacy*. The reach of telecom providers is unparalleled in the history of African politics; there were 557 million subscribers in 2015, a continent-wide penetration rate of 46 percent. As mentioned above, in the colonial and post-colonial period, the broadcasting of state power in Africa was predominantly through radio. While radio remains the most accessible communication medium – some 70 percent of African households own a radio set – it is declining in importance and lacks
the interactive component offered by telecom providers through voice, messaging, and internet services. As Rotberg and Aker contend, “the ubiquity, reach, and simplicity of mobile telephones” means that they “can receive information and its user can then cross-examine the conveyer of that information … in the absence of other low-cost communication devices, it is hardly surprising that mobile telephones have been widely adopted across the developing world.”

The intimacy of telecom providers with citizens – mobile phone users are inherently reliant on telecom providers – illustrates that foreign direct investment (FDI) by telecom providers is unique because of the number of citizens tangibly impacted. Whereas FDI projects in oil and mining also involve significant capital expenditure by MNCs, the impact of this investment is largely confined to local communities and the rents repatriated to the central government. The mass penetration of mobile phones also points to Breckenridge’s notion that informational technologies do not only affect the lives of the wealthy, but rather that “the poor are in direct contact with cutting-edge technologies.”

The second rationale concerns dependency by both state and citizen on telecom providers. Telecom providers offer significant economic gains for African states, with approximately $17 billion of tax raised before regulatory fees in 2015. Additionally, the telecom industry constituted 6.7 percent of the continent’s GDP in 2014, a figure predicted to expand to 7.6 percent by 2020. Many African states and neoliberal international organizations have also embraced telecom providers for state-building endeavors by constructing ICT for Development ("ICT4D") frameworks to seize the power of mobile communication and spur positive development outcomes. In addition, the state relies on telecom providers to disseminate public safety announcements and for communication between government employees. Thus, telecom providers have constructed a new mode of politics “between the state and private companies, which increasingly handle many of the core activities of the state.” Citizen dependence on telecom providers has also increased. As Pierskalla and Hollenbach contend, “mobile phones in Africa are often the only way for interpersonal, direct communication over distance.” Additionally, the “techno-optimist” school expresses the benefits of mobile telephony in market terms, with positive relationships having been established between increased network coverage and enhanced market efficiency. Regardless of the precise extent to which telephone providers have spurred economic growth, it is clear that African citizens and states
are deeply reliant on telecom providers for this “opium of the people.”

The broad reach of telecom providers, coupled by the state’s deeply intertwined relationship with them to effect certain state-led logics, means that the state engages in a more intimate manner with telecom providers than other corporate actors. Alluding to McLuhan’s adage, this “medium” posits a significant structural shift in African politics, for a new form of politics has emerged whereby private firms increasingly handle many of the core activities of the state. With both the public and private sector dependent on the mobile networks functioning smoothly, the state’s growing reliance on telecom providers to deliver services underscores that the latter have become a mode by which citizens experience the state. This challenges Cooper’s contention that post-colonial states inherited colonial-era “gatekeeper” mechanisms to enforce order and distribute resources. Although state-linked telecom regulators entertain some agency when engaging with telecom providers, such as the provision of operating licenses, the latter’s socio-economic influence highlights the growing power of private actors to control “the interface of national and world economies,” a realm traditionally the preserve of the state. While telecom providers are not the first corporate actor to exploit this structural adaption, the deep dependency exhibited by both state and citizen, coupled by their intimate reach, casts telecom providers as a powerful and novel corporate actor with which the state must increasingly act in concert.

**MTN in Nigeria and Rwanda**

Case studies of the South African telecom giant MTN in its Nigerian and Rwandan markets situate the extensive dependency of state and citizen on telecom providers, and highlight that citizens perceive these private actors as a new face of the state. With global revenues of $11.35 billion in 2015, 232 million subscribers, and operations in 22 countries, MTN is one of Africa’s largest telecom providers. Founded in 1994, MTN entered Nigeria and Rwanda in 2001 and 1998 respectively, following the liberalization of their telecom markets. Whereas Nigeria’s telecom market is heavily liberalized, Rwanda’s telecom sector is deeply informed by state-directed logics geared towards its “Vision 2020” programme to become a knowledge-based economy. MTN has the largest subscriber base in both states, and in 2015 employed capital expenditure projects of $852 million in Nigeria; figures for Rwanda are not published. Sutherland notes that MTN entered Nigeria using an empowerment model, whereby shares were provided to politically-influential individuals in exchange for assurances.
that its license would not be revoked. Similarly in Rwanda, MTN’s initial partnership with the governing party’s investment arm, Tri-Star/CVL, illustrates the deeply interconnected relationship between telecom MNCs and African states.

Beyond its financial clout, other factors render MTN worthy of investigation. The company has had a rocky relationship with the Nigerian government, with allegations of poor regulatory compliance and corruption; Sutherland contends that in Nigeria, “MTN gave stock to presidential cronies to secure licenses.” By contrast, Rwanda’s ICT4D strategy has seen the state enjoy a more positive relationship with MTN as they work in partnership to realize this prerogative. Thus, exploring MTN-Rwanda offers an indication of how a strong state engages with an MNC whose revenue is higher than its GDP (see Figure 1). Analyzing MTN-Nigeria and MTN-Rwanda also assesses the extent to which this paper’s framing of telecom providers as a new corporate actor can be transported to diverse operating environments in Africa. Finally, as a Southern MNC, MTN affords an examination of South-South flows of FDI and the extent to which accusations of “electronic imperialism” can be levied against African MNCs.

MTN-Nigeria: Security

In May 2013, the Nigerian government barred mobile telecom services in three northeastern states. Premised on the belief that insurgents from the terrorist group Boko Haram were using unregistered SIM cards to coordinate attacks, Nigeria’s four telecom operators, including MTN, were prevented from operating for four months and a state of emergency was declared. Although the government considered the shutdown a military success, it was criticized heavily by citizens who felt that the state deprived them of a vital service, unleashing calls of state illegitimacy. Citizens’ anger was not directed at telecom providers, but rather towards the state, implying that the state’s use of powerful private actors to pursue state goals informs how citizens experience the state. Indeed, Nigeria’s harnessing of private actors to pursue state security goals points to the notion that, relative to the state, telecom providers command a greater reach over Nigerian citizens.

MTN’s engagement with the Nigerian state during this period extended beyond shutting down services. In the preceding two years, MTN was required by the government-aligned Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) to register customers’ SIM cards to mitigate the threat from Boko Haram. However, MTN failed to comply with the June 2015 deadline. The NCC charged that MTN had failed to register 5.2 million SIM
cards, and was thus complicit in both contravening regulatory requirements and posing a security threat. MTN was slapped with a $5.2 billion fine by the NCC, the largest fine ever levied in Africa. MTN’s malfeasance extended to the diplomatic realm when Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari declared, during a state visit by South African President Jacob Zuma, that MTN’s failure to register SIM cards resulted in the deaths of 10,000 Nigerians. Illustrating the negotiating power of telecom providers, MTN challenged the legality of the fine and even threatened to pull out of Nigeria, threatening to deprive the state of one of its largest taxpayers. Ultimately, the fine was reduced to $1.6 billion and MTN received a renewed license to extend its 4G services, thereby raising the question of the extent to which the politics of money can supersede national security concerns.

**MTN-Rwanda: Taxation**

Aligning with Rwanda’s digitally-informed Vision 2020 framework, the state has harnessed MTN-Rwanda’s technological expertise and penetration to improve its tax collection procedures. In December 2016, MTN and the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) launched an initiative via MTN’s Mobile Money (electronic wallet) platform to “ease the process and reduce the cost of doing business in the country.” Under the scheme, taxpayers can transfer funds directly to the RRA from their Mobile Money accounts, with MTN earning a premium for facilitating the transfer. With 85 percent of MTN’s 4.1 million customers already using Mobile Money, MTN represents an ideal partner for the Rwandan state to improve its tax accrual methods.

However, the MTN-RRA partnership has implications for telecom providers’ role in African politics. Not only is the MTN-RRA partnership a mode to enhance state revenue, it also harbors moralizing and modernizing elements by incentivizing citizens to fulfill their civic duties. MTN’s statement that subscribers must no longer take time off “to honor their civic obligations” and “can pay their taxes from … any remote location outside the premises of RRA” resonates with Larkin’s argument that colonial authorities embraced communication technologies to “modernize” their subjects. Attesting to the reach of telecom providers relative to the state, this program illustrates that, like Nigeria, the Rwandan state is leveraging the power of telecom providers to advance goals that the state itself struggles to secure. The MTN-RRA partnership also offers the Rwandan state a greater capacity to identify who has paid taxes, alluding to Scott’s notion that the state inherently seeks to extend its power by simplifying its population through bureaucracy. This is
particularly salient in Rwanda, which Purdeková argues has been operating an extensive state-led surveillance apparatus since the pre-colonial period. The fundamental difference between the MTN-RRA partnership and previous eras, however, is that telecom providers are now a crucial vehicle to realize this goal.

African Politics and Telecom Providers: A Double-Edged Sword

As per McLuhan, MTN’s experiences in Nigeria and Rwanda reveal that the medium of the telecom provider has a powerful message for African politics. No other private actor commands an equivalent degree of reach and dependence by both state and citizen. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that African states harness the power of telecom providers to advance state goals such as security and tax collection. This resonates with Herbst’s contention that colonial and post-colonial states constructed communication infrastructure to broadcast state power and achieve logics of centralization. However, the crucial amendment in this scenario regards who controls these processes. While radio and communication infrastructures during these periods were the preserve of the state, private telecom providers now challenge this position. State logics are no longer singularly effected by the state, but rather in concert with private actors.

In the examples offered above, despite being deeply intertwined with state-led logics of security and tax accrual and relying on state regulators to maintain its license to operate, MTN exerts considerable agency in its cooperation with the state. This agential qualification underscores McLuhan’s notion that the medium itself must be examined to interpret the structural shifts effected by the message. MTN’s failure to register SIM cards denied the Nigerian state an individual identification of citizens (including potential terrorists) – a goal Scott argues is crucial for broadcasting state power – ostensibly causing thousands of deaths. Although MTN was fined, this transgression nevertheless underlines that the state engages in a more intimate relationship with this novel force of corporate actor than ever before, and illustrates the extensive dependency of the state on telecom providers. The considerable reduction in the fine, coupled by Nigeria’s plea that MTN not leave the market, highlights the negotiating power exercised by MTN over the Nigerian state. Unfortunately, however, the negotiating relationships between African states and telecom providers are opaque and deeply under-theorized in the literature, so MTN’s influence must be implied rather than being made explicit. Nevertheless, the contours of these negotiating
relationships should spur further study, particularly because MTN’s asymmetrical financial advantage is only exacerbated in the poorer states outlined in Figure 1.

The state’s use of telecom providers to realize particular goals also illustrates that telecom providers have become a new face of the state, with deep implications for African politics. Although the Rwandan case study suggests that MTN-state collaboration can enhance state efficiency, the uproar following MTN’s shutdown in northeastern Nigeria highlights citizens’ dependence on telecom providers. If the state shuts off access to this medium, this can lead to protests and challenge the legitimacy of the state. MTN’s actions thereby point to a deep structural shift and a new manifestation of politics between the state and private actors that increasingly handle many of the core activities of the state. While national regulators can constrain certain ambitions, the deep dependency that citizens and states exhibit towards telecom providers highlights that African states must increasingly act in concert with telecom providers. Although the state maintains sovereign power, it nevertheless validates the importance of telecom providers by exploiting their services to counter what the state perceives as a threat. Thus, the harnessing of communication infrastructure to broadcast power is no longer the preserve of the state, but rather deeply interwoven with the distinct interests of private telecom providers.

Indeed, it is important to consider the divergent motivations between state and corporation, and the ensuing implications for African politics. Telecom providers are not guided by social emancipation but rather by a fiduciary duty to enhance profits for shareholders. A key driver for MTN is growing its customer base; in doing so, spaces for mobilization proliferate, with repercussions for democratization. Like the subversive “Radios” noted by Bayart, telecom providers can, in the absence of severe state censorship, enable access to social media, offering citizens a new vehicle to construct alliances, critique state policy, and mobilize for change. For example, the rise of MTN social media bundles to attract customers offers a foil to the “top-down” broadcasting practices that characterized how the state engaged with citizens. Although the extent to which social media can spur democratic change is beyond the scope of this paper, telecom providers nevertheless establish a pervasive medium for interactive communication that the state’s radio and fixed-line telephony services cannot. While we should be cautious in ascribing considerable causal power to social media for enhancing democracy, telecom providers offer both citizens and
opposition actors a new platform that can be leveraged for democratization.

Thus, the advent of telecom providers represents a double-edged sword for African states. Positively, they can be harnessed to pursue emancipatory development and security outcomes. However, because telecom providers represent a new face by which citizens experience the state, the perceived misuse of these actors can challenge state legitimacy. The reach and extensive dependency of state and citizen on telecom providers highlights that the distribution and consumption of communication has been fundamentally altered, illustrating that this medium—a corporate actor with pervasive political salience—has a powerful message for African politics. Today’s broadcasting of state power in Africa exists to a considerable extent in conjunction with agency-wielding private actors, a novel phenomenon for postcolonial states whose broadcasting mediums traditionally enjoyed a monopoly on the distribution of information. Although the importance of telecom providers does not necessarily decrease the state’s capacity to broadcast state power, the state’s strong dependence on telecom providers means that they must adapt to not only the decentralizing and democratizing implications afforded by the onset of these actors, but also the innovation and agency exhibited by the telecom provider itself. These findings raise intriguing questions for further study: to what extent are telecom providers eroding state sovereignty? Is state and citizen dependence on telecom providers irreversible? Is it useful for the state to view citizens as consumers? With African states transitioning to digitally-informed modes of governance and mobile phone subscriptions booming across the continent, the need to examine telecom providers’ message for African politics has become more acute than ever before.

Notes


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Feature


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Abstract
This paper discusses the emerging regional approach of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in regard to support to its member states in countering terrorism and violent extremism. Its central idea is that “connected security” must be realized to counter and overtake the growing threat posed by violent extremism. Insecurity is dynamic in form and methods, adaptive and self-sustaining, and continues to deepen and find new territory if not properly checked. To reverse insecurity, addressing the common sources and neutralizing enabling conditions in a connected manner will lead to more sustainable outcomes than merely focusing on symptoms.

Introduction
Violence and armed conflict are not new to the West African region. From
the pre-colonization and colonial eras to the post-independence and post-Cold War periods, the causes, nature, methods, scale, and effects of violent conflict have been diverse. The region has witnessed a long history of native resistance, nationalist struggle, ethno-religious conflicts, coups d’état, proxy wars, and politically-motivated violence. Notably, since the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, there has been a marked difference in the way that violent conflict is perceived, and a progressive adaptation in the way it is addressed. In the first two decades of its existence, the orientation of ECOWAS’ common defense instruments was limited to defining symmetrical relations among states as distinct from addressing internal conflict within states. However, with the escalation of internal conflict in several member states at the end of the Cold War, the organization realized the need to develop and enforce common security norms. Hence, the pivotal Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (the Mechanism) which was adopted by ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in 1999, put conflict prevention, early warning, preventive diplomacy, mediation and facilitation, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance on the front burner.

The story is quite different today. Four decades after its formation, new and emerging security threats, particularly terrorism and violent extremism, maritime piracy, and other transnational organized crime, are now altering the security landscape in the ECOWAS region. The emerging security environment requires new approaches, partnerships, effective tools, and robust actions by stakeholders at all levels to effectively respond to and reverse the threats. As early as 2001, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government at its 25th Ordinary Session called on member states to ratify and locally adapt all United Nations and African Union instruments in the fight against terrorism. This call also included the need to apply the ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and the Convention on Extradition. Further responding to the growing threat, the Heads of State and Government adopted a Political Declaration and Common Position Against Terrorism in 2013, to which is annexed the ECOWAS Counter-terrorism Strategy and its Implementation Plan. These constitute a robust and proactive framework to assist member states in their efforts to prevent and combat terrorism.

This paper discusses the regional approach of ECOWAS in regard to support for its member states in countering terrorism and violent ex-
tremism. It examines the policy toolkit at the dispensation of ECOWAS while analyzing issues from a human security perspective and security governance lens. The paper advocates a deepening of efforts aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE) which go beyond the current counter-terrorism struggle. Drawing on regional experience, the paper suggests opportunities for improving CVE and offers lessons for Nigeria. These lessons proceed from observations of the interplay between the country’s national context and regional dynamics.

The following deductions are highlighted: (1) terrorism is only one symptom of a societal dysfunction, and the symptoms may manifest in varied forms; (2) localized counter-terrorism efforts alone cannot reverse-engineer the current state of dysfunction in society; (3) CVE efforts need to go beyond de-radicalization and tap deep into addressing the root causes of violent extremism; (4) comprehensive security governance and a whole-of-society approach should be the starting point in CVE, not the end point; and (5) the idea of “connected security” must be realized in practice to counter and overtake the growing threat posed by violent extremism.

The connection needs to happen at different levels: (1) across relevant departments of the ECOWAS Commission through an Interdepartmental Working Group; (2) among security agencies in a member state through an Interagency Working Group; (3) among armed forces and security services across several member states; (4) between states in the ECOWAS region and states of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) region; and (5) through leveraging global partnerships for impact at the national level.

The paper is divided into seven main parts. Following this introduction, the framework for understanding the terms “terrorism,” “terrorist acts,” and “violent extremism” are discussed in the first section. The second section sheds light on ideas related to human security and security governance. In the third and fourth sections, attention is drawn to ECOWAS’ response to violent extremism, as well as the organization’s humanitarian action in Nigeria’s troubled northeast zone. Threats posed by violent extremism go beyond the Northeast, and accordingly, the fifth section elaborates this issue. While the sixth section focuses on opportunities to improve CVE and what is instructive for Nigeria, the seventh section offers suggestions regarding the next critical steps for ECOWAS in the region.

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**Terrorism, Terrorist Acts and Violent Extremism**

In spite of the depth of research over the decades, only a few definitions of terrorism have attracted much
appeal, even though they are still not universally accepted. One comprehensive definition that draws upon the unifying components of over 100 other definitions is the one proposed by Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman. These scholars explain that:

“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.”

This definition may of course omit certain aspects related to the evolving nature of terrorism in recent times, but it nevertheless comes close to capturing much of its character in countries such as Nigeria. Bearing in mind this general understanding of what terrorism symbolizes, a terrorist act (actus reus) can further be understood as a means that certainly involves action. In another sense, terrorism can also be recognized as a state which is effected by terrorist acts on the thoughts, minds, conduct, or action of people, communities, and the government. Such states include fear, shock, trepidation, and capitulation. Therefore, a state of terrorism may be evoked by threats, if the person or group making the threat is reasonably believed or perceived to have the capacity to carry out the threat. Terrorist acts involve extreme violence or violent criminality of atrocious levels, including indiscriminate shootings, gruesome mass murders, assassinations and targeted killings, bombings, abductions, hijacking, destruction of public facilities, social services and infrastructure, and attacks and destruction of communities.

Section 1(2) of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (as amended) defines an “act of terrorism” so broadly that it may be interpreted to include gas flaring or pipeline vandalism, if other elements of the crime are established. The Act also criminalizes and prescribes punishment for related offences including hostage taking, kidnapping, and failure to disclose relevant information, among other things. Effectively, the Act prohibits most forms of anti-state violence committed with malice aforethought, and acts of violence intended to seriously intimidate a population. Notably, while the Act criminalizes acts of terrorism and the financing of terrorist groups and activities, it does not criminalize the state of terrorism. This is a fine line with significant legal, policy, and operational implications.
It suggests that measures to address criminalized acts of terrorism are essentially different from measures to address the state of terrorism, which touches on the hearts and minds of the people. While counter-terrorism falls under the former category, countering violent extremism (CVE) falls under the latter.

Terrorism and violent extremism are not new to Nigeria. The Maitatsine riots in parts of northern Nigeria between 1980 and 1985, which claimed over 4,000 lives, were inspired by individuals who used religion as a tool in the most fundamental and dangerous way possible. Policemen were targets of the anti-state violence. Although the violent activities of the group were domestic, its membership traversed national borders and included Nigerians, Nigeriens, Chadians, and Cameroonians. In fact, the leader Mohammed Marwa (nicknamed Maitatsine) was reported to have originally come from northern Cameroon and migrated to Kano in Nigeria around 1945. Similar to Boko Haram decades later, Maitatsine preached against Western-inspired culture, including the use of radios, watches, bicycles, cars, and the possession of more money than was necessary. It also took the resolute involvement of the Nigerian Army to end the rebellion in parts of northern Nigeria.

Looking beyond the Northeast, the plurality of radicalization and violent extremism in Nigeria should inform a broadening of the lens of security governance to ensure adequate responses that can address the disparate but connected threads of radicalization, militancy, insurgency, violent extremism, and terrorism in all parts of the country and across the national borders. Addressing the root causes of dissatisfaction with the state, which may manifest in anti-state violence, should, for instance, include efforts at improving local governance, engaging and regulating informal and non-state security providers, curbing corruption and illegitimate enrichment of public servants, and bringing the government closer to the people in concrete terms. Disconnection between the far-flung central government and local communities creates the space and enabling conditions for disaffection, radicalization, and violent extremism.

Human Security, Root Causes, and Security Governance

The term “human security” was introduced into the ECOWAS peace and security lexicon in a pivotal way by the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) of 2008. The overall aim of the ECPF is to strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa. Article 6 of the ECPF defines human security as referring to “the creation of conditions to eliminate pervasive threats to people’s and
individual rights, livelihoods, safety and life; the protection of human and democratic rights and the promotion of human development to ensure freedom from fear and freedom from want.” The first component of the definition acknowledges the pre-existence of multiple and persistent pressure points that pose a threat to rights, livelihoods, safety, and life, and starts out to create conditions that will eliminate those threats. The second component advances the achievement of positive acts that will consolidate conditions that eliminate the threats, and the development of the human condition to the extent that such threats become a thing of the past (freedom from fear and freedom from want). While the first component may be seen to be backward looking and corrective, the second component is more forward looking and protective. Taken together, the two offer a robust response to human insecurity.

Uncannily, the aforementioned definition of human insecurity is more or less repeated in Article 72 of the same ECPF, which enumerates the objectives of security governance. According to Article 72, “the objectives of Security Governance shall be: [i] to eliminate threats to individual and group rights, safety, life, livelihoods, and property, and the protection of the institutions and values of democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law under a human security umbrella…” Although the ECPF succeeds in putting human security on the front burner, it makes no mention of violent extremism, and makes only passing mention of terrorism (Article 40) and prohibition of terrorist activities (Article 74(d)), in reference to African Union and United Nations instruments and as an interest for future development, respectively. The simple reason is that terrorism and violent extremism had not gained currency in the region when the ECPF was adopted in 2008. It took the escalation of violence by Boko Haram in 2009 and the intensification of its attacks up to 2012 affecting parts of northeastern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon before a strategic regional response could be developed. Therefore, the ECOWAS Political Declaration and Common Position Against Terrorism of 2013 and its annex, the ECOWAS Counter-terrorism Strategy, were by then a sensible and necessary add-on to the comprehensive regional peace and security architecture. However, the ECOWAS Counter-terrorism (CT) Strategy does not do enough to address violent extremism and its root causes.

First, the CT Strategy mentions extremism and radicalization in the context of religion (or more appropriately, exploitation of religion), thereby relegating other sources of violent extremism such as political
exclusion and economic deprivation to a blind spot. Secondly, CT is too limiting a frame with which to address all forms of violent extremism and their root causes. Although the ECOWAS CT Strategy (Section III, Pillar 1(e)) touches on preventing extremism and radicalization as one of its priority areas of intervention, violent extremism should be conceived and tackled beyond the War on Terror. Undoubtedly, there is a strong correlation between the rise in terrorism and increasing violent extremism. This, however, raises a potential risk in attaching—and therefore limiting—efforts in addressing violent extremism to efforts targeted at countering the “clear and present danger” of terrorism. The root causes of violent extremism predate the rise in terrorist acts that became obvious in the region from 2009. While violent extremism is an instrument currently instigated by terrorist groups to achieve their mission, as long as the root causes and underlying conditions that enable it remain unaddressed, it may become a tool in the hands of other lethal groups or morphing interests in the future. It is therefore necessary to humanize the approach to ‘CVE’, and to address the root causes of violent extremism from the wider lens of security governance.

Let us consider “root causes” more closely. Section III of the ECPF, which touches on the root causes of violent conflict, links human insecurity to a continuum: the negative transformation of structural factors through the exacerbation of conflict accelerators, and the degeneration of conflict into open violence, which is often sparked by triggers. In other words, addressing the root causes of violent conflict—in this case, violent extremism—needs to go beyond the surface to uncover the conditions that breed violent extremism. Article 10 of the ECPF further identifies root causes such as poverty, exclusion, gender inequalities, and political and economic inequalities as “the primary source of latent, indirect violence.” Thus seen, genuine grievances and a sense of denial resulting from poverty, exclusion and political inequalities, deprivation, and lack of economic opportunities, among other factors, may remain in parts of northeastern Nigeria long after the War on Terror is won, and therefore cannot be sufficiently addressed under the rubric of countering terrorism. By extension, failing to address poverty, exclusion, and political or economic inequalities in other parts of Nigeria may create conditions that breed violent extremism in various forms.

On the contrary, if we assume that violent extremism constitutes a threat to individual and group rights, safety, life, livelihoods, and property, and that the threat constituted by violent extremism undermines the institutions
and values of democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law, then the human security umbrella offered by security governance becomes a robust frame for addressing the threat. This point is buttressed by the comprehensive approach of the recently adopted ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance of 2016. Security governance as a strategic approach is overarching and cross-cutting. It effectively links security efforts including counter-terrorism, maritime security, control of small arms and light weapons (SALW), border security, cross-border initiatives, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), early warning, peace education (the culture of peace), peace support, women and youth empowerment, and democratic governance. Promoting security governance is crucial to creating conditions that will eliminate the threat posed by violent extremism, and it will have a knock-on impact on all segments of the security sector.

By being the first regional instrument to enunciate future action to address terrorist activities, the security governance component of the ECPF forms the basis of the CT Strategy and ECOWAS’ strategic efforts at countering terrorism and violent extremism. Article 74(d) of the ECPF prescribes that ECOWAS shall develop, adopt, and enforce prohibition legislation on mercenary and terrorist activities, and other cross-border criminal activities. Although the Political Declaration and Common Position Against Terrorism and the annexed CT Strategy fall short of a binding legislation or convention, they are nonetheless a giant step in ECOWAS’ ongoing efforts at developing a model law on CT and harmonizing CT laws and strategies of its member states. However, security governance does not stop at being a forerunner to the CT Strategy. The other two objectives enumerated in Article 72 of the ECPF address the reform of the security sector and seek improvement of security provisioning, management and oversight. Article 72 further underscores that the objectives of security governance shall be:

“[ii] to orient the focus and capacities of individuals, groups and institutions engaged in the security system to make them responsive and responsible to democratic control and adhere to basic human rights and the rule of law;
[iii] to ensure the emergence and consolidation of accountable, transparent and participatory security systems in member states.”

Therefore, improving security governance will not only promote human security and strengthen efforts at countering terrorism, violent extremism, maritime piracy, money laundering, and other transnational
organized crime, but will ultimately make security a public good and a vital element of sustainable development.

ECOWAS’ Response to Violent Extremism: ‘Connected Security’

ECOWAS’ response to conflict and insecurity in all its forms – and recently to terrorism and violent extremism – has been progressive, multi-dimensional (whole-of-society), and often reactive, but increasingly proactive. In comparison, “Insecurity is dynamic in form and methods, adaptive and self-sustaining, and continues to deepen and find new territory if not properly checked.” According to this view, traditional, new, and emerging threats to security in the ECOWAS region, including drug trafficking and other illicit trafficking, irregular migration, natural resource smuggling, SALW proliferation, maritime piracy, terrorism, violent extremism, money laundering, and cybercrime all feed into one another. The rationale is quite simple: insecurity in any context arises mostly from common sources (structural factors) and thrives where it finds enabling conditions (accelerators), though it manifests in various forms which may interact with one another. To reverse and overturn insecurity, addressing the common sources and neutralizing the enabling conditions will lead to more sustainable outcomes than merely focusing on the symptoms.

With unprecedented advancements in information and communication technology, and fluid mobility of human, material, and financial resources, organized criminal networks are also increasingly interacting in ways that outpace the response capacity of state security agencies. In addition, weak links in the security chain such as porous borders, demotivated security officials, poor training, outdated equipment for crime prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution, widespread disenchantment with state security actors, weak governance structures, and weak regulatory regimes are exploited by traffickers, pirates, and terrorists alike. By addressing actual and potential weak links and neutralizing enabling conditions in the security environment in an integrated manner, “connected security” therefore forms a web of insurance that will make people feel safer and create a conducive environment for human development.

Clear policies and instruments, organs, and related programs in multiple sectors aggregate to such a web of insurance: a comprehensive toolbox for response available to ECOWAS, which addresses the root causes and enabling conditions of violent extremism. The policy documents and instruments should be understood not merely as lifeless black letters on plain white paper, but as widely
consulted and deeply negotiated confidence-building processes involving regional experts, civil society actors, member state representatives, and interest groups and partners, whose outcome is a common standard or expectation mutually agreed upon by the parties. The bottom-up process of development, improvement, and adoption of the policies and instruments, which often takes years, helps to ensure ownership and facilitate implementation.

Landmarks in ECOWAS’ progressive development include the following:

* Deliberate expansion of focus and mandate from inter-state to intra-state conflicts, as evidenced in the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993.
* Commitments to promoting democracy and political governance, as encapsulated in the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001.
* Regulation of economic activities and their relation to free movement of persons and trade across borders by the ECOWAS Regulations on Transhumance of 1998 and 2003.
* Control of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition, and other related materials, as enabled by the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of 2006.
* Deliberate strategy on strengthening counter-terrorism and CVE, as evidenced in the Political Declaration and Common Position Against Terrorism and ECOWAS Counter-terrorism Strategy of 2013.
* Renewal of the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan to Address...
Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa 2016-2020, which touches on CT and CVE.

* Efforts at addressing food security, development and stability in the Sahel area, as elaborated in the ECOWAS Sahel Strategy 2016-2020.
* Comprehensive approach to improving security governance enabled by the Supplementary Act on the ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance of 2016.

The ECOWAS CT Strategy advances three main pillars for action: Prevent, Pursue, and Repair. One of the priority areas of intervention under the Prevent pillar deals squarely with CVE. The section is reproduced verbatim hereunder.

(e) Prevent extremism and radicalization:
* Develop measures to identify and counter the propaganda methods used by extremist sects to lure and recruit youths and other vulnerable groups into violent and radical ideologies;
* Work with religious and community leaders, scholars and relevant civil society groups to develop de-radicalization and reintegration programmes and to promote mainstream religious teachings, interfaith and inter-ethnic dialogues, and reconciliation.

Such programmes should seek to address the conditions conducive to youth radicalization, including unemployment, lack of participation and representation in political and economic processes, injustices, lack of education, social delinquencies, frustration and deprivation;
* Faith-based institutions, including churches and mosques, should be encouraged to participate in government programmes and to take initiatives to prevent radical ideas and extremist elements that seem to have empathy with terrorism;
* Develop and, where necessary, enhance counter-terrorism curricula for schools and universities to promote awareness of terrorism and counter-terrorism measures;
* Develop and, where necessary, strengthen national laws to criminalize recruitment, propaganda, incitement, support for or the attempt or conspiracy to participate in violent radical ideologies, including hate crimes and the use of religion to commit violent acts leading to death, injury or damage to property;
* Eliminate racism and other forms of discrimination; and
* Prevent occupation, colonialism and other forms of domination.

Coming on the heels of the ECOWAS CT Strategy was a systematic study,
the ECOWAS Conflict Risk Assessment 2013-2014. The assessment examined country risk factors and emerging threats such as terrorism, violent extremism, and their complex interactions, which are now becoming realities. By combining qualitative analysis of the human security issues in the member states with quantitative elements and predictive analysis, it identified root causes of conflict, political, economic, and social conflict risk factors, vulnerabilities, conflict triggers, mitigating factors, response options, and recommendations for each of the 15 member states. The robust study supports evidence-based decision-making on CVE and other conflict risks in the states. ECOWAS is also gearing up to support its member states in implementing community-based early warning and response initiatives to counter violent extremism, radicalization, insurgency, and terrorism (VERIT), initially in Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal.

Until recently, training curricula for the armed forces and security services in many ECOWAS member states have focused on public order, state security, regular warfare, and peacekeeping, and have not sufficiently addressed counter-terrorism, CVE, and counter-insurgency. This gap has been noted as one of the reasons why Nigerian troops have greatly succeeded in peacekeeping in many regions of the world but have encountered challenges in counter-terrorism efforts at home. It has also informed the prioritization of training in counter-terrorism and CVE by ECOWAS to plug the gap. The Regional Security Division of the ECOWAS Commission, with the technical assistance of the Institute for Security Studies, has developed the ECOWAS Counter-terrorism Training Manual, and has used the tool to train over 300 law enforcement agents in various ECOWAS member states since 2013. Some modules of the CT Training Manual go beyond theory, legal aspects, and operational responses to terrorism to address issues relevant to CVE efforts, including intelligence and counterintelligence, early warning mechanisms and coordination, border control, victim support, and the role of the media.

In view of increasing the understanding and focus of political decision-makers on CVE, the ECOWAS Council of Ministers also approved a sensitization campaign against radicalization and violent extremism in Mali, Niger, and northern Nigeria for 2017. Together with other relevant directorates, partners, and member states, greater efforts would be directed at preventative aspects of CVE at the national and regional levels, and at improving human security and economic opportunities around border communities.
Notably, both the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice and the Community Parliament have made extra-judicial and non-binding pronouncements regarding their commitment to contribute to the fight against terrorism and related crimes. Furthermore, various statutory organs and specialized institutions of ECOWAS have a mandate to address terrorism, the financing of terrorism, and violent extremism. These organs and institutions include the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIA-BA), the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO), the Chiefs of Intelligence Services of ECOWAS, the Committee of Chiefs of Security Services (CCSS), and the Committee of the Chiefs of Defense Services (CCDS). They work to improve regional security cooperation and crime prevention, and to combat cross-border crime through information sharing, joint operations, harmonization of legislation, and procedures, among other tasks. They also report periodically to national and regional political authorities, including the Ministers in Charge of Security, Mediation and Security Council, and Heads of State and Government on crime trends, emerging threats, planned action, and programs.

Nigeria: Beyond the Northeast

While a global outcry has trailed the abduction of schoolgirls from the Chibok community in Borno State in 2014 – heralded by the #BringBackOurGirls campaign – significant local, national, and international resources have been channeled to pursuing terrorists and neutralizing the threat of Boko Haram. There have also been renewed efforts aimed at addressing the plight of affected and displaced communities, even though comparatively little attention and resources have been directed to addressing the root causes of violent extremism. Boko Haram’s scorched-earth tactics and its focus on attacking soft targets (unarmed civilians in schools, places of worship, villages, markets, and motor parks) contributed to demonizing the group and making it a constant headline in national and international media, as well as in public discourse. It would be recalled that Boko Haram’s notoriety was already a significant security threat back in June 2013, when then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan authorized the gazetting of an order which officially brought the activities of the group within the purview of Nigeria’s Terrorism (Prevention) Act.

The geostrategic location of the group around the Lake Chad basin and its incursions into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, coupled with its hit-and-run tactics, continue to pose
operational challenges to ill-prepared forces from the affected states. However, centralizing analysis on Nigeria, the focus on Boko Haram and the Northeast does not remove the fact that other forms of violent extremism exist and continue to emerge in other parts of the country. Neither does it dilute the primary responsibility of the state to protect and safeguard the lives, livelihoods, and property of its citizens in all parts of the country.

It is commendable that Nigeria has developed a CVE program to complement the revised National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) of 2016. This seeming marriage of CT and CVE efforts raises the need for both conceptual clarity and contextual practicality to address the complex nature of the challenge and to determine appropriate points of intervention in order to achieve desired results. A series of key questions need to be addressed. For instance: at what point and under what conditions does radicalization begin to manifest in violent extremism? Do radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism overlap? What are their points of convergence and divergence? Do they arise from the same sources or motivations? Are there sufficient national laws or provisions in the criminal code addressing the threats? Does disproportional use of force by the armed forces and security agencies engender radicalization and violent extremism, and how may this be addressed? Are responses adaptive enough to checkmate the ever-changing and adaptable nature of terrorism and violent extremism? Will a victory against Boko Haram signal the end of the complementary CVE efforts and lead to fatigue in efforts to address the root causes of violent extremism?

It is instructive that Boko Haram remains the only organization which has been proscribed in line with Section 2 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011. Nonetheless, of the six geopolitical zones in the country, none can be said to have been totally free of some manifestation of radicalization and violent extremism in the past two decades. The major manifestations have included the following.

**Northeast:** Boko Haram radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism.

**Northwest:** Southern Kaduna crisis involving nomadic herdsmen and settled communities, violence between the Shi’ite movement and state security forces, and Islamist religious radicalization.

**North-central:** Recurring ethno-religious crises around the Jos Plateau, rampant clashes between nomadic herdsmen and settled farming communities.

**Southeast:** Radicalization by the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, the Indigenous People of Biafra,
rampant kidnapping, and communal conflict.

Southwest: Militancy linked to the Oodua People’s Congress and other groups, long-drawn communal conflicts, and politically-motivated violence.

South-south: Militant insurgency and violent extremism by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Niger Delta Avengers, among other groups, abduction of oil workers for ransom, oil pipeline vandalism, and politically-motivated violence.

Each of the geopolitical conflict complexes highlighted above is distinct and dynamic in its scale, complexity, intensity, trajectory, and effect, and the origins of some have been traced back to fault lines created by the pre-colonial “Scramble for Africa,” which scattered “culture areas” across artificially-created borders, while lumping together different ethnic nationalities into artificially-created containers. This practice was continued by the colonial amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 alongside a reserved Colony. Different forms of colonial administration adopted in the different regions capitalized on cultural, economic, and social divisions and other factors that reflect the complexity of the newly-created Nigeria. The problem with the historical narrative is that no regard was paid to what appears to be the natural dividing lines among the peoples and ethnic nationalities and, with independence, no serious attempt was made to use those lines as the bases for negotiating a federation that would respect the diversities while building on common interests and a common destiny in an organic way. This structural factor has become a perennial source of conflict.

Furthermore, emerging trends seem to suggest that some of the geopolitical conflict complexes are now interacting in ways that were not anticipated by the national responses that have been crafted so far. For instance, some elements of Boko Haram terrorism in the Northeast have been linked to the escalating nomadic herdsmen-settler conflicts from the north-west zone through the North-central, Southeast, Southwest and the South-south. The Global Terrorism Index 2015 identified “Fulani militants” (nomadic herdsmen) as one of the five most deadly terrorist groups in 2014 and a serious threat to stability in Nigeria. Boko Haram and the so-called “Fulani militants” are also reportedly linked particularly in regard to smuggling and organized crime. The death toll by the “Fulani militants” in Nigeria was put at 1,229 in 2014. Desperate measures to curb the attacks, such as the re-introduction of the National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill in 2016 and
the related move by the federal government to import protein-enriched grass from Brazil, have stirred further controversy. With the spike in their attacks in 2016 and the decimation of Boko Haram, this emerging form of mobile violent extremism risks becoming a major threat to security and stability in Nigeria.

Opportunities to Improve CVE: Lessons for Nigeria

In the face of multiple pressure points that cumulatively threaten human security, as well as the social fabric and liberty in the country, Nigeria’s CVE program needs to look beyond addressing radicalization and violent extremism in the Northeast. A preoccupation with religiously-motivated violent extremism alone, rather than robustly addressing its structural undercurrents and root causes, distorts the security realities and may further exacerbate the security situation in Nigeria. Looking towards the future, the key lesson is that addressing the root causes of violent extremism through comprehensive security governance and a whole-of-society approach should be the starting point of efforts in CVE, not the end point.

An Experts Meeting that preceded the Regional Security Summit in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2016 proposed cogent recommendations for improving CT and CVE efforts. In addition to those, the following opportunities to improve CVE derive from ECOWAS’ comprehensive approach to security governance. Given that the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) plays a coordinating role for security services, ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs), and other stakeholders in CT and CVE efforts, the following are primarily addressed to the ONSA, but also to other agencies.

Strategic Opportunities

1. Adopt a comprehensive approach to CT and CVE. CT strategies and CVE programs should not be designed or implemented in isolation or as ad hoc responses to localized terrorism. Ideally, CT and CVE should be situated within an adaptive national security strategy, while the national security strategy is linked to national development objectives that address the root causes of violent extremism. There is, of course, a lot of room for improvement in Nigeria’s budding CVE program.

2. Match strategies and normative prescriptions (NACTEST and the CVE program, among others), technical skills, and operational techniques with an understanding of contemporary political, social, cultural, economic, and religious conditions that may enable or stifle violent extremism in various parts of the country. What works in the Northeast may not work so well
in the Middle Belt region or in the Southeast, and may even be counter-productive.

3. Adopt issue-based strategic decision-making and continuous strategy development. Often, strategy planning and review (NACTEST, CVE program) follow a two- to five-year cycle and are disconnected from strategic decision-making, which needs to happen frequently in response to emerging threats and fluid conditions. However, the evolving nature of the threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism, as well as their changing dynamics, require that strategy development be adaptive and continuous to enable proactive and real-time strategic decisions.

**Governance Opportunities**

4. Strengthen collaboration with legitimate informal and non-state security providers (the Civilian Joint Task Force, vigilante groups, neighborhood watch outfits) to extend security and vigilance to areas that are hard to reach for state security services. Improve complementarity, regulation, training and reorientation, and integration of these groups into community policing measures beyond the war against Boko Haram.

5. Widen and deepen ongoing support to grassroots governance structures, community-based early warning and response initiatives, and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in all parts of Nigeria. Religious and community leaders are effective conduits for defusing extremist propaganda. In addition, counter-radicalization, de-radicalization, strategic communication, the promotion of interfaith dialogue, building community resilience, education and a culture of peace, mutual coexistence, and tolerance should all be encouraged.

6. Using a pyramid synthesis from localized to regional and national levels, promote broad-based national dialogue to engender homegrown demand for better governance and to enable a reconfiguration of political, security, and social relations for a more egalitarian society. Dialogue should go beyond conferences in Nigeria’s federal capital territory (Abuja) and must include groups and communities directly affected by violent extremism.

**Operational Opportunities**

7. In cooperation with neighboring states, strengthen border security initiatives to plug supply and transit routes for terrorist and violent extremist groups, and improve human security and economic opportunities around border communities to expand sources of
livelihood. This will also improve vigilance and remove a significant motivation for unemployed youth to join terrorist and violent extremist groups.

8. Address violent extremism related to transhumance, particularly the activities of nomadic herdsmen, to complement measures such as the establishment of grazing reserves to reduce itinerant activities. It is also necessary to leverage external expertise and tap into local knowledge to undertake DDR and prioritize reorientation of nomadic herdsmen and cattle-breeding communities using a three-pronged approach of information, sensitization, and education.

9. Humanize the war against terrorism. Summary executions, detention of suspects without trial, and excessive or disproportionate use of force may result in breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law. This will further undermine public trust in the state security forces and breed further radicalization and anti-state violence.

Next steps for ECOWAS

There are additional opportunities for ECOWAS to improve its support to its member states in CVE. Although ECOWAS’ support is conditioned by the twin principles of subsidiarity and complementarity, which reserve to its member states the primary responsibility for peace and security, ECOWAS provides an added layer of support and offers comparative advantages in mobilizing the 15 member states to address challenges in ways which no state acting alone can. The following steps will improve regional support to CVE.

National Level

1. Encourage member states to ratify relevant conventions and protocols that are yet to enter into force, particularly the 1999 Mechanism and the 2001 Protocol Against Corruption. In reflection of ECOWAS’ evolving supranational status, the new legal regime of Supplementary Acts removes the need for ratification and makes the acts binding on member states and the institutions of the Community upon signature.

2. Support national capacity building for CVE. It should be noted that civil society actors, the media, police, customs, immigration, prisons service, intelligence, and other law enforcement agencies in member states are currently ill prepared to address new and emerging forms of violent extremism. This creates a huge gap in translating strategies and policies to action and impact.
Therefore, to buttress this point, ECOWAS’ support to CVE must be implemented in partnership with national/local actors.

3. Promote inclusive national development to create the enabling environment that can translate regional strategies into impact in member states. The ECOWAS Vision 2020 addresses five themes that chart its path to the original objectives of regional development and economic integration, and indeed a Community Development Program was set up to implement this vision. The regional vision and action needs to be matched by bottom-up actions and support in line with national needs and priorities.

**Regional Level**

4. Promote coherence, joint planning, and joint implementation of multi-sector programs and initiatives to improve security governance and CVE. Regional CVE efforts demands the coordination of multiple directorates and divisions at the Commission, including Regional Security, Early Warning, SALW Control, Humanitarian Affairs, Political Affairs, Legal Affairs, External Relations, Migration and Free Movement, Gender, Youth and Drug Control, Infrastructure, and Agriculture. Cooperation often falls short of coherence and coordination.

5. Strengthen regional and cross-regional cooperation and information sharing for CT and CVE beyond the fight against Boko Haram. Although operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force and cooperation with the Economic Community of Central African States (involving Cameroon and Chad) have been crucial in the success in CT, it took a long time to build trust and to attain operational efficiency. Improving information sharing, cross-learning and joint operations through institutions such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit, WAPCCO, CCSS, and GIABA will strengthen CVE efforts.

**International Level**

6. Strengthen partnerships to deliver technical and financial assistance for CVE, and enhance alignment with continental (African Union) and global (United Nations) efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Both the ECPF and the CT Strategy reflect cooperation measures with international organizations and resource mobilization with partners under their enabling mechanisms. These provisions should be revived and channeled to the most critical areas of need at the national level.
7. Become a model to other regional economic communities and regional mechanisms of the African Union in connecting local needs and national ownership of CVE efforts to international support for addressing the root causes of violent extremism. To achieve this, rather than addressing violent extremism as an afterthought, it is necessary to develop a clear strategy for supporting national CVE efforts. While CVE efforts are often framed as terrorism prevention, ironically, international consensus building and commitments to CT date back to 1994, but similar efforts in CVE are about two decades late.

Conclusion
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015, is described as a plan of action for people, planet, and prosperity. Beyond the banner and the primary goal of eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, Paragraph 55 of the UNGA Resolution captures a way of doing things that is relevant to both human development and human security efforts. This is essentially the idea of “connected development”: the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and targets are integrated and indivisible (horizontal connection), and they endorse leveraging global partnerships in solving national and local problems (vertical connection). Relating the SDGs to the challenge of peace and security generally and violent extremism specifically, connected development finds expression in Goals 16 and 17.

Following similar lines of reasoning for human security – and a plethora of literature and policy directions – this paper uses the idea of “connected security” in advocating for comprehensive security governance and leveraging global partnerships in solving emerging and evolving security challenges such as violent extremism. Connected security is encapsulated in Aspiration 4 of the African Union’s Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, and Theme II of the ECOWAS Vision 2020: Towards a Democratic and Prosperous Community. Connected security is not just an idea that should exist only in academic texts, or an aspiration that should exist only in policy documents. It must be realized in practice. This will certainly not come easily because it challenges traditional structures and ways of doing things. Due to the fact that insecurity is increasingly connected and complex, a similar approach of comprehensive security governance is needed at the national level beyond localized efforts.
Notes


4 Center for Democracy and Development, An Assessment of the ECOWAS Counter-terrorism Strategy and Implementation (Abuja: CDD, 2016), II.


11 ECOWAS Commission, “ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework,” Articles 72(ii) and (iii).


13 Some of the instruments are yet to enter into force – for instance, the Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption. Some entered into force provisionally upon signature, pending ratification. An example is the 1999 Mechanism.


20 Mike Opeyemi Omilusi, “Roving Terrorists or


25 Goal 16 is dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels. Goal 17 is dedicated to the promotion of partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society. These inclusive partnerships built upon principles and values, a shared vision, and shared goals are needed at the global, regional, national, and local level.

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Abstract
African economies are under pressure to grow at a higher rate in order to raise living standards and create sufficient jobs for its bulging youthful population, through application of science, technology, and innovation as articulated in continental and global development agendas such as Agenda 2063 and the 2030 UN Sustainable
Development Goals.

African universities are being called upon to change their mandate from the traditional focus on teaching to include research, extension, and commercialization of research output— in other words, to become “innovation universities.” This article attempts to describe the framework within which African universities might be transformed into innovation universities.

Introduction and Background

African economies are under pressure to grow at a rate fast enough to raise living standards and provide jobs for the continent’s rising young population. And there is a specific call to African universities to transform into innovation universities, in order to assist their governments achieve this goal. The question is how? Based on new economic growth theory, also referred to as exogenous growth theory, the source of national economic growth can be explained better by nations’ technological and scientific progress, as opposed to what neoclassical economists once suspected: namely, that the level of economic growth was dependent on nations’ capital, land, and labor endowment.

Increasingly, however, the term “innovation” has replaced “technological progress” in development policy circles as the main driver of economic growth. In a narrow sense, innovation is the process of finding real-world applications of new knowledge; using old knowledge to solve new problems; or improving an existing process in such a way as to improve the quality of the products or raise production efficiency, or improve products’ competitiveness on the market—a phenomenon that was first described by Joseph Schumpeter as “creative destruction.” In a broader sense, innovation means the generation of “a new combination” from existing sources of knowledge, capabilities, and resources.

The agents involved in leading the innovation process are called entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial agents come in different shapes and forms such as individuals, private firms, public enterprises, not-for-profit organizations, or governments.

The factors driving innovation may not necessarily be found in a single firm or by isolated individuals locked away in their garages (as often portrayed in the popular press about Silicon Valley entrepreneurs-turned-billionaires), but often come about as a result of the interaction of firms or individuals with external players such as other firms, research institutions, and universities.

A linear, albeit now abandoned, view of innovation that equates high R&D spending with a high probability of successful innovation has been challenged by the fact that the
innovation process is characterized by great uncertainty of the outcomes and strong feedback loops of influences at play between innovation itself, growth, and market structure.

This in turn has led to a systems view of the innovation process as more likely to take place in a networked arrangement, currently referred to as national innovation systems. Consequently, the goal of innovation policy instruments that are designed and implemented by many countries has been to bring together different parts of the economic system to engage in innovation. This can be in the form of industrial clusters in a locality; or national, regional, or global innovation networks.

Strong and mutually supportive complementarities must exist between different parts of the innovation system and the innovation policy instruments. Efforts must constantly be exerted to monitor and identify complementarities that are lacking, or that may hinder innovation, and providing them in order for the innovation system to deliver desired outcomes.

This paper tackles a number of themes under different sections. These are the Nordic experience with national innovation systems, the dynamics of technological catchup, the Japanese experience with industrialization, the establishment of African innovation universities, the Israeli experience with technology transfer through universities, the lessons that could be learned by African universities aspiring to become innovation universities, and final conclusions.

The following section looks at the Nordic experience with national innovation systems, which may help provide an understanding of basic concepts underlying national innovation systems.

The Nordic Experience with National Innovation Systems
A national innovation system defines the interaction of a national economic system with a political system and national institutions. By reviewing the experience of three Nordic countries – Sweden, Norway, and Finland – with setting up national innovation systems, a common concept that is shared is that of setting up knowledge infrastructures that take care of the needs of important industries (such as the mining, fisheries, forestry, agriculture, and maritime sectors). This knowledge infrastructure is composed of interacting entities such as universities, specialized technical institutes; public specialized funding bodies targeting R&D in some sectors including small- and medium-size enterprises; technical research councils; public research organizations (PROs); research institutes; ministries of science and technology, and trade and industry, which coordinate the activities of national innovation sys-
tems; holistic innovation policies; and centers of excellence co-financed by government and industry and located at universities.

Different innovation policy instruments as well as national innovation strategies were also developed in these three Nordic countries to support development of specific priority industries. In Norway, for example, the government supported firm-level R&D with tax credits. Prominent in the Nordic experience with innovation knowledge infrastructure is the improvement in the quality and increase in size of tertiary education to a world-class level, especially in Finland (which boasts one of the best-educated labor forces in the world). Furthermore, efforts have been exerted to strengthen public-private interactions in order to make it more effective and increase funding of R&D, paying special attention to social innovation and both demand-driven and user-driven innovations. Of late, Finland has pushed to establish top, world-class ranking universities that would function as global magnets of skills and resources. It has to be noted that while universities are closely embedded in the Swedish innovation model, in Norway and Finland innovation happens outside the university – that is, in public research organizations (PROs). Finally, expressed in Nordic national innovation systems is the critical role of political will and commitment of adequate resources in achieving results. For instance, a multi-stakeholder body named the Research and Innovation Council is chaired by the Finnish prime minister. Its membership consists of relevant ministries, important firms, and business associations. Its function is to act as an advisory and coordinating body for research, technology, and innovation policy in Finland. The next section will consider other factors that influence countries’ ability to modernize their economies: the dynamics and concepts underlying technological catchup that must be borne in mind when embarking on the path of economic modernization.

Dynamics of Technological Catch-up
The fact that African economies are characterized by low productivity, especially in agriculture and food production, provides ample opportunities for rapid technological advancement and productivity catch-up with the rest of the world. Moses Abramovitz convincingly argued that countries that are backward in levels of productivity have the potential for rapid advance and catch-up with “leader” countries by “leapfrogging” (the adoption of frontier and best-practice technologies with less resistance from vested interests, and replacing antiquated capital stock as well as established practices). However, for
this to happen, the continent must develop sufficient “social capability” in order to succeed in exploiting and harnessing existing technologies for productivity gains and increased economic output. Abramovitz recognizes the challenge of defining “social capability” precisely and gives as an example the post-World War II growth achieved by Europe and Japan, which were until then technologically behind relative to the United States, but socially advanced.

Variation in social capability from country to country is believed to explain the observed productivity differentials among countries, as it affects their ability to absorb new technologies or apply new ideas for economic advancement. A nation’s social capability is partly dependent on its population’s technical competence as provided by its education system, and the restrictions imposed by the existing institutional arrangements on nations’ ability to make technological choices in response to pressures for change. Countries with experience in the organization and management of large-scale enterprises, with functioning financial institutions, and with markets that can mobilize large amounts of capital to fund individual firms are said to enjoy more social capability. In an African context, one must hasten to point out that with less developed institutions, and mostly rural social structures, catch-up presents many challenges to African nations, but also provides opportunities for structural changes.

Indeed, a paper by Fulvio Castellacci and Jose Natera, “The Convergence Paradox: The Global Evolution of National Innovation Systems,” reinforces this concern in regard to their analysis of convergence between and evolution of national innovation systems in the wider global context. Particularly, they highlight the complementary roles of techno-economic and socio-institutional systems that underpin many national innovation systems’ frameworks. Against this backdrop, this article turns to learn from Japan’s path to industrialization in the section below in hope of informing the current debate on developing national innovation systems in the African context.

Japan’s Experience with Industrialization
Japan’s successful experience in modernizing its economy as a latecomer, and the development path charted by other Asian economies in the 1990s, can guide Africa’s technological catch-up with the developed world. In the task of modernization, some scholars of Japan’s economic history, notably Keiji Maegawa and Kenichi Ohno, describe the economic catch-up process as involving the integration or absorption of latecomers into the existing world economic system through
the transfer of “best practices” to the developing country. In order to take ownership, preserve national identity, and ensure social continuity, this process is never passive, but takes place within the framework of *translative adaptation*. It means the developing country on the receiving end can and should decide the terms of integration by modifying foreign ideas and systems to fit the local context. Furthermore, Keiji Maegawa divides the task of modernization in the Japanese context, and possibly elsewhere, as simultaneously affecting four subsystems:

* Economic modernization through industrialization;
* Political modernization (democratization and building institutions of governance);
* Social modernization involving a shift from closed rural communities to open urban communities; and
* Cultural modernization (harmonizing traditional customs and values with scientific and rational thinking that befit an industrialized society).

While it is relatively “easier” to achieve economic modernization, Maegawa recognizes that political, social, and cultural modernization/change proceed at a much slower pace and are in constant tension with economic modernization. The tension between the four components of modernization needs to be managed effectively by the government and the people of the developing country in order to ensure success.

Other aspects that can be gleaned from the Japanese industrial success include:

* Locomotives and carriages companies
* The expansion of higher education and secondary technical education throughout the country, which facilitated the absorption of technology in all economic sectors
* The spread of Confucian values through the education system
* The sending of high-level official missions to Europe and the United States to gain insights into Western technology and systems (Iwakura Mission, 1871-1873)
* Starting with light industries around Japan’s main export product (silk, and later cotton and textiles) and moving along the value chain, from producing intermediate products through to the production of finished aprons and garments
* Reorganization of farming communities
* Institution and collection of rice tax
* Establishment of agricultural research centers
* Holding of trade fairs
* Sending of Japanese students to study in the West to acquire expertise in targeted areas of relevance to Japanese economy, especially
textile machinery and shipbuilding and later heavy machinery and railways, and the protection of nascent industries against competition
- Subsidies by the government of targeted industries
- Establishment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in heavy machinery, railways, and shipbuilding
- Hiring of foreign experts to work as advisors in factories and ministries
- Domestic industries for import substitution
- Promotion of industries at the local level
- Active export promotion by MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry)
- Licensing of foreign technologies and signing strategic alliances with foreign technology companies
- Building of financial institutions that allowed internally funded growth (no external debts)
- Imitation/modification/complete adoption of Western technologies
- Agriculture commodity exchange markets and development of distribution networks in support of farmers

Having reviewed the experience of Japan as a successful economic latecomer, we now turn to the concept of African innovation universities.

African Innovation Universities

The literature on the potential, albeit yet to be realized, role of African universities as drivers of national economic growth and development has emphasized the importance of building and supporting African research universities and increasing the number of African universities in the top-ranked 500 world-class universities. This argument is supported by recent analysis of the world’s top 100 most innovative universities conducted by the Intellectual Property and Business department of Thomson Reuters, which showed that 50, or half, of the most innovative universities are based in the United States (See Figure 1 below and Table 1, which lists the top 25 most innovative world universities). The ranking assessed published papers and quantified universities’ collaboration with industry, their levels of activity, and their success and influence in patenting.

Thomson Reuters’ findings correlate well with the United States’ indisputable technological and economic leadership in the world. Furthermore, it may also explain why 32 universities in the United States are listed among the top 100 QS World Class Universities for 2016-17 (see the QS Ranking for 2016-17 and compare with Table 1). These two related aspects combined to support the call that African universities need to redefine their mandates and transform their institutions into innovation
universities in order to accelerate the continent’s economic transformation; namely, the achievement of African Union Commission Agenda 2063, the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA-2024), the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Plan (CAADP), and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals 2030. By so doing, it is equally implied that more African universities will also climb the ladder of world-class, high-ranking universities.

To count as innovation universities, African universities are required to combine teaching with research, extension, and commercialization activities of research results and patents. Universities cannot do this in isolation, but must be important components of local, national, regional, and possibly global innovation systems. African innovation universities can learn from the experiences of industrialized economies to design, and participate in the implementation of national innovation strategies, while helping governments manage the tensions arising from modernization of the continent’s economies by learning from the experiences of Japan and other Asian economies.

Given sufficient financial backing, and with the right kind of leadership, African innovation universities can facilitate technology transfer to vital economic sectors. This will help accelerate the phase of technological diffusion, absorption, and adaptation on the continent. In the Nordic context, innovation policies are defined as those policies affecting the diffusion of technology in an economy so as to enhance labor productivity and improve economic returns to the stakeholders. This notion should guide the framing of the mission and goals of African innovation universities. The overriding goal for the new orientation of African innovation universities is to raise economic output, improve productivity in economic sectors such as agriculture, in which the continent enjoys a great comparative advantage through the application of science, technology, and innovation to improve productivity and add value, and to create agricultural products-based industries.

Since most of the world’s top innovation universities are also top-ranked, world-class universities as in the case of the United States, some of the reforms needed to climb the rank of world-class universities can be used to transform current African universities into innovation and world class universities based on the Washington Accord and Multi-Objective Integrated Model for development of world-class universities.

Among the many strategies African universities can follow to transform include (in no particular order of importance and not meant to be exhaustive):
### Table 1. List of World’s 25 Most Innovative Universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stanford University</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard University</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Washington</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Michigan System</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern University</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Texas System</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>University of Wisconsin System</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Advanced Institute of Science &amp; Technology (KAIST)</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial College London</td>
<td>England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pohang University of Science &amp; Technology (POSTECH)</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California System</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Southern California</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Delivering academic programs that build social capital necessary for institutional transformation to facilitate rapid technological absorption and adaptation through diffusion of management, and entrepreneurial, business, finance, and ICT education
2. Collaborating with technical and vocational education and training (TVET) institutions to develop specialized training programs in relevant technologies
3. Push for hybridization of vocational training and higher education by borrowing from current research on the topic (see for example Lukas Graf, “The Hybridization of Vocational Training and Higher Education in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland”)
4. Interacting with policymakers to promote innovation policies
5. Entrepreneurship and small business training programs
6. Business schools
7. Innovation policy research centers
8. Postgraduate studies at the master’s level in innovation and technology management
9. Multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary research and programs
10. Public policy research centers
11. Out-of-class experiential earning
12. Internships
13. Production of highly employable graduates
14. Students and staff exchange programs
15. Fully residential campuses
16. Strong, high-quality postgraduate and research programs
17. Technology-assisted learning
18. Commercialization of academic research

(Source: Thomson Reuters)
19. Technological adaptation
20. Extension services
21. Collaborative research
22. Innovation policy monitoring, analysis, and advisory services
23. Innovation policy research and advocacy
24. Establishment of centers of excellence around national or regional products
25. Membership in innovation networks
26. Transfer of technologies to relevant sectors
27. Small business research units
28. Strong university-industry linkages
29. Science and business parks
30. Affiliation of technically specialized universities and TVET colleges
31. Establishment of centers for research on skill formation and labor markets
32. Establishment and upgrading of technical institutes connected with line ministries to innovation universities
33. Development of curricula responsive to the needs of industry

Finally, the following section highlights an example in which a single innovation university has made such an impact on a nation’s economic and scientific advancement through innovation, thereby lending credence to the notion that African universities must transform into innovation universities in order to contribute more effectively to the continent’s economic transformation.

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**Israel’s Experience with Technology Transfer Through Universities**

Further insights could be gained to guide the setting up of African innovation universities by reviewing Israel’s approach to university-led innovation, especially the contribution of Technion-Israel Institute of Technology to the country’s technological progress.

Recall that Thomson Reuters’ ranking of the world’s most innovative universities put Israel in tenth place, together with Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands, each contributing two universities to the list of the top 100. Technion was established in Haifa in 1912 as a technical school training plumbers, electricians, and construction workers for Jewish Palestine; and for retraining Jewish emigrants fleeing World War I to settle in the then Palestine.

Later, Technion trained civil engineers and architects who literally built the Jewish nation. It also supported agriculture with the technical expertise needed, as well as building the capability of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) when the country came under a French arms embargo in the run-up to the 1967 war. It is now involved in a cutting-edge missile shield defense program with global partners such as the United States, with two Nobel Prize laureates in chemistry under its belt. As of its 100th anniversary, some 67,000 Technion graduates
hold a total of 90,000 degrees from the university, 60,000 of whom are still living. Of those, 25 percent are either CEOs or VPs of companies, 41 percent hold management positions, 25 percent of graduates at one time have worked at or started a new company, 15 percent of its female graduates have launched businesses, and 12 percent work in research. Furthermore, 50 percent of all Technion graduates are employed in jobs that produce, create, or design goods and services.

Notable about Technion is its:
* Responsiveness to needs of the economy and national security
* Strong connection with hands-on vocational training (it has its own technical secondary school)
* Ability to raise funds from the Jewish diaspora
* Strong collaboration with the government
* Hosting of science parks and business incubators
* Location in Haifa, which attracted massive FDI by global high-tech companies
* Broad-based science education to its graduates
* Built-in entrepreneurship and business training to its science and engineering graduates
* Strong links to industry and follow-up with its alumni

Conclusions
To wrap up, this paper has tried en-
rich the framework within which the debate on how to transform African universities into innovation universities can take place. While it did not provide specific answers to specific questions as to how this might be achieved, the paper reviewed the literature on the evolution of innovation as a key feature underpinning growth and economic competitiveness, as well as highlighted the significance of national innovation systems as vehicles for driving innovation in many countries around the globe.

First, based on a cursory review of the literature on growth theories, it noted that the term “innovation” has replaced “technological progress” in development policy circles as the main driver of economic growth. Here the focus has been on a broader Schumpeterian definition of innovation as the creation of “a new combination” from existing sources of knowledge, capabilities, and resources. Second, while acknowledging entrepreneurship as a key force or agent driving the innovation process, it points out that innovation happens more in a networked environment in which different economic actors such as firms, research institutions, and universities interact within so-called national innovation systems, noting that an entrepreneurial entity can be an individual, firm, public for-profit or non-profit organization, or state. Third, the success of Japan, Israel,
and other Asian economic latecomers is seen as providing lessons on the dynamics of technological catch-up to be taken on board, particularly on the importance of translative adaptation of international best practices to fit national contexts; as well as management of the tensions that are bound to arise between economic modernization on the one hand; and political, social, and cultural change on the other.

Finally, the paper has pointed out the empirical links between innovation universities, the countries where they are located, and the economic leadership of these countries. This supports the view that African universities must transform into innovation and world-class universities because the two concepts are almost one and the same. Key references are provided for those who want to pursue an in-depth study that might lead to further insights on the framework and the path of the African continent’s efforts at economic catchup through university-led innovations.

Notes
8 In her pamphlet The Entrepreneurial State, Mariana Mazzucato argues against the Washington consensus that governments’ role should solely be confined to creating conducive conditions for innovation to thrive while letting the private sector lead, in favor of an entrepreneurial state where the government takes a more activist and envisioning role in order to create new markets by spending in uncertain but new technologies with high growth potential. This, she argued, can make innovations occur at a much higher rate than would have been possible under free market conditions. See Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State, 70.
9 As told, for example, by Mark Stephens in his best-seller that was published under pen name Robert X. Cringely, Accidental Empires: How the Boys of Silicon Valley Make Their Millions, Battle Foreign Competition, and Still Can’t Get a Date (Boston:
Addison-Wesley, 1992).


12 Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State, 65.


17 Castellacci and Natera, “The Convergence Paradox.”

18 Examples include the formation of Aalto University by the merger of Helsinki University of Technology, Helsinki Business School, and University of Arts and Design. See Jan Fagerberg, “Innovation Systems and Policy,” 18.


4 Ammon Frenkel, Shlomo Maital, and Ilana DeBare, Technion Nation: Technion’s Contribution to Israel and the World (Haifa: Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, 2012).
Enhancing South Sudan’s Prospects through Advancing an Ambitious Security-Development Agenda

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Abstract
This article focuses on the transitions that have taken place in the recent history of South Sudan and assesses their impacts on its future political and economic prospects. The paper argues that there are three broad areas in the security-development nexus that must be addressed before South Sudan’s national security can substantially improve. They include Sudan-South Sudan relations, tribalism, and economic restructuring. Related to these points are a number of other factors that suggest that an agreement in key areas could significantly enhance the prospects for national security through a cascade effect. The main related issues include a durable oil revenue agreement with Sudan, greater border control, better government engagement with civil society, and renewed attempts at power-sharing. In addition, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of various domestic militia groups into a more vibrant national economy needs to
take place, with greater enforcement support from international donors outside of the Quartet.

Introduction
Since independence in 2011, the stability of South Sudan has been extremely fragile; in fact, South Sudan was considered the most fragile country in the world in 2014. This has especially been the case after it began experiencing internal ethnic conflict in December 2013 due to a power struggle between the president and vice-president, which has killed an estimated 50,000 people so far. This paper argues that there are three broad areas in the security-development nexus that must be addressed before South Sudan’s national security can improve. They include Sudan-South Sudan relations, tribalism, and economic restructuring. This approach includes reference to major reports such as the Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) Report from joint donors, and the Final Report from Sudan’s Assessment and Evaluation Commission - the body that supports and monitors the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Many issues remain unaddressed in the CPA, which governs most aspects of Sudan-South Sudan bilateral relations, and a persistent mistrust about interference in each other’s internal affairs continues to dominate decision-making in Juba and Khartoum. Although Sudan and South Sudan have committed to a Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), the border remains militarized and trade is disrupted. Economic development has thus been slowed by ongoing disagreements with Sudan, including over an oil revenue-sharing agreement which has limited oil exports that are vital to generating the majority of revenue for the national budget.

A further complication is the changing allegiance of groups who live on the Sudan-South Sudan border and the military factions rather than state security forces that operate there. This agriculturally significant and oil-rich region is also where two civil wars connect. The border security issues are common on South Sudan’s other borders; for example, the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo has been called “impoverished, contradictory and contested.” A more useful term for the border area surrounding South Sudan (which often extends into adjacent sovereign territories as well as its own) is a “borderscape.”

State-building has been retarded on a number of fronts, mainly by factors linked to tribalism. These include problems over power sharing at the executive level, decentralization in favor of tribal influences in decision-making, questions over state sovereignty in conflict regions, and a
lack of security-sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) - also for reasons related to tribal identity, threat perception, administration, and logistical problems. In response, international donors have been forced to shift from supporting a national development program to supporting humanitarian assistance programs that help alleviate the worst effects of the renewed violence.

By addressing security-centric issues, the government of South Sudan can help free up international donors to concentrate on development initiatives. By signing further agreements with Sudan on border security and economic relations, Juba could use oil production revenues to fund a broad diversification program necessary to support economic growth, employment, and other state-building and state consolidation activities. First of all, it is necessary to contextualize these components with a brief overview of South Sudan’s recent history.

South Sudan’s Recent History and its Impact on Security and Development

South Sudan has undergone a series of existential crises and tensions throughout its history, some of the events having taken place in the remarkably obstructive context of colonial politics.

Firstly, there was concentrated economic, political and adminis-
groups that were not content with the agreement refusing to go back to Sudan, which led to the Akobo mutiny in 1975. In 1978, a group of Nuer dissidents calling themselves “Anynya II” took up arms in eastern Upper Nile State. Attempts were made to sustain the agreement through armed struggle, including the emergence of the SPLM, created by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which fought for a united, democratic, and secular Sudan. However, by 1983, President Gaafar Nimeiry had declared all Sudan an Islamic state under shari’a law (Chevron had discovered oil deposits near Bentiu in southern Sudan in 1981), which made the peace agreement null and void. From then on, there were ongoing tensions between North and South due to Islamist politics in Khartoum, which demanded the forcible Arabization and Islamization of the South.

Following the signing of the CPA in 2005, South Sudan achieved statehood and secession from Sudan in 2011. The CPA included five protocols on power sharing, wealth sharing, security arrangements, conflict resolution in South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, and Abyei, and was heavily supported by the Quartet (the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway and Italy) and partners such as the African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The CPA included provisions for a referendum on South Sudan’s self-determination. It marked the beginning of the SPLA’s institution-building efforts and the forerunners to state ministries, and local county and municipal administrations. In 2006, the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration by the SPLA and South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) facilitated the implementation of the CPA, and reconciliation and unity between the two forces. Although it led to some temporary political stability, challenges remain.

**Current Contentions in Sudan-South Sudan Relations**

There is still an uneasy peace with Khartoum because of its alleged role in South Sudanese affairs. There are also a number of unresolved political issues that add to the tensions between Juba and Khartoum. These include sovereignty disputes over the central Abyei region, and fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLM-North (SPLM-N) rebels in the two border regions of the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Fighting continues in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and humanitarian assistance is not able to get through due to both sides resisting calls for access. There are mixed loyalties on the border: the SPLM-N is a northern Sudanese movement, including SPLM veterans from the 1983-2005 civil war, but is also engaged in an alli-
ance with rebels in the Western Darfur region (Sudan Revolutionary Front) against Sudan. Darfur’s relations with South Sudan are important because the SPLM is fighting in Darfur on behalf of those who wanted independence from Khartoum. Indeed, the aim of the rebels is to remove Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president, from office. Furthermore, both the independence of South Sudan and Darfur’s humanitarian crises (continuing into 2014) have been widely publicized in the West, which has created some distortions when assessing Juba’s emerging track record versus that of Khartoum’s. However, this has not necessarily meant that western sympathies have directly translated into actionable results on the ground. The United States failed to move aggressively on the Darfur conflict in 2003, partly because the African Union (AU) mission was acting as an impediment. The tendency, at least in the early 2000s, was also for states such as the United Kingdom to put Darfur on the backburner and concentrate on more positive aspects of political agreement, leading up to the CPA in 2005.

The September 2012 Cooperation Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan was aimed at establishing two viable states, peaceful relations, and conclude outstanding negotiations from the CPA such as disputed border areas, the final status of Abyei, and mechanisms for dealing with CPA agreements. However, little progress has been made on any of these points and they have been fundamentally undermined by further instability in South Sudan.

South Sudan has been subjected to aerial bombardment by Sudanese forces in disputed oil-rich regions such as Heglig. President Bashir has, in the past, closed the border and refused to accept South Sudanese oil to transit through Sudan, even on the basis of increasing the fifty-fifty split revenues, due to disputes over late payments, processing, and tariff fees. The government of Sudan is also alleged to have under-reported oil revenues by as much as 20 percent in the late 2000s, therefore leaving South Sudan with a shortfall in its profit-share with Sudan. South Sudanese President Salva Kiir closed the oil pipelines, arguing that Sudan was stealing the oil of South Sudan, and more recently he has argued that the transportation fees are too high. For South Sudan, which depends on oil revenue for 98 percent of its budget, this has led to considerable tensions with Khartoum. By late 2015, oil issues appeared to be partially resolved, but without an oil-sharing agreement that is respected by both sides, oil production will continue to be below pre-2012 levels of half a million barrels a day.

The motivation behind the re-
newed proxy conflict between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan is thus based on a number of outstanding political and security-related grievances, including a lack of trust exacerbated by alleged human rights abuses carried out by the government of Sudan, and the rigging of elections in South Kordofan State. The aim of the SPLM-N is to foster “... a new center for the benefit of all Sudanese people regardless of their religion, gender or ethnic background.” The SPLM-N commented that the CPA was only signed because it was reinforced with a credible threat from the still-standing SPLM-N forces. They are therefore predisposed to maintaining such forces to ensure that future agreements are honored by the government of Sudan.

The SPLA
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) formed in 1983, and continued with the armed struggle that had been apparent between the marginalized sections of society and the central government in Sudan since before the colonial period. Although hostilities were temporarily halted by the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, the struggle for independence has continued apace.

The dominance of the security sector in South Sudanese politics is one key reason why the transition to statehood has been so problematic. These groups, notably the SPLM/A, which have a strict hierarchy, internal instability, and extrajudicial habits, are associated less with the state than with the interests of their leadership. In 1991, Lam Akol and Riek Machar defected from the SPLA to initiate their own rebel groups, called the SPLA United and the South Sudan Independence Movement, respectively. This led to increased competition but also the integration of the “Anyanya II” forces into the SPLA, while the splinter groups were supported by Khartoum (since they operated in oil-rich areas such as Unity State, which would give the North direct access to oil).

In 1997, the Khartoum Agreement was signed between the government of Sudan and the various militia groups in South Sudan. The agreement covered various aspects such as freedom of religion and movement, and defined a four-year interim period for both sides to recover from the civil war. It did not include the SPLA, and therefore represented a hollow document that could not succeed in bridging the transition to South Sudan’s secession at that time. It did give South Sudan the right to a referendum on secession, and also formalized non-SPLA militias into the SSDF headed by Riek Machar. However, in practice, the government of Sudan did not abide by the agreement, and it was eventually
The SPLM/A fought military offensives in 1997 on the borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea against Khartoum’s proxy forces in the South, the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). However, following South Sudan’s independence, such groups are considered to be political opposition groups rather than military adversaries. The mixed allegiances based on the interests of different tribal groups is incredibly damaging to the stability of the new state. While both sides appreciate the autonomy that South Sudan’s independence has brought, the ability of Khartoum to continue to co-opt groups that are unsatisfied with political progress will continue to be a source of conflict. Within the SPLA itself, the track record of splinter groups forming is notable, but the state’s dependence on continuing oil exports will enhance national support for Kiir over Machar.

The SSDF was supposed to form part of the SPLA or the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) by January 2006, as outlined in the Juba Declaration. However, against the provisions of the CPA, it kept a presence in Jonglei State, Upper Nile State, and elsewhere, and continued to act as Sudan’s proxy. This inability of armed groups to reform through negotiated agreement – even as recently as January 2014, when IGAD led peace talks in Addis Ababa – has meant fighting continues in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile States, undermining national security and delaying development well into the period following South Sudan’s secession.

The symbiosis of the SPLM/A and the South Sudanese political system is clear when considering that eight out of ten governors elected in 2010 came from the ranks of former or serving SPLA commanders. This has led to a militarized political environment, which is a problem in itself. For example, General Paul Malong, the former Dinka governor of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, is alleged to have recruited a 15,000-strong tribal militia force, and he is also accused of breaking the law by defying Kiir’s orders in 2013. In April 2014, he was made Chief of General Staff of the SPLA by Salva Kiir, sending a poor signal as to the modus operandi of the government.

Unsurprisingly, South Sudanese government engagement with civil society has been poor. The Constitution Review Commission, which started work in February 2012, has been slow to engage in public consultations. Due to civil conflict in 2013, funding partners such as USAID have pulled out, and when the government’s term was about to expire in July 2015, Salva Kiir moved quickly to extend the government term by three years in order to avoid a power vacuum from opening up.
In August 2015, a new power-sharing Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) was set up for 30 months to oversee a political, security, and economic reform plan, as well as approve a new permanent constitution and elections. It includes more than 20 commissions to look at the most pressing issues, from refugees and roads to anticorruption and security. In the security realm, a Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism involving the warring parties and civil society groups, a Strategic Defence and Review Board, and a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) were set up. The JMEC is to oversee the agreement on the resolution of conflict, report breaches, and find solutions, but the competition, rhetoric, and violence between the Nuer and Dinka tribes, in particular, continues.

Amendments to the 2011 transitional constitution are still on the table, chief among them proposals to increase the number of states from 10 to 28 and to allow President Kiir to appoint the new states’ governors and lawmakers. Opposition lawmakers immediately rejected such plans, saying they went against the constitution they were trying to amend. In areas such as Greater Upper Nile, where tribal and political factions are numerous, ongoing conflict continues to compromise the formation of a new and properly functioning political and economic system.

**Tribalism and Rebellion in South Sudan**

The growth of what might become state institutions has been continually hampered by at least two armed rebellions against the government in Juba. Corruption has also been an issue, including the high tribute paid to secure nominations and selection to both local and state positions. Competing ethnic, clan or sub-clan identities, as well as special interest groups, are responsible for the emphasis on patronage, which is eroding the legitimacy of the emerging unitary state. Central state authority therefore remains a relative term, even accounting for the billions of dollars spent by donors on developing state institutions. This is problematic on a number of levels. There have been tensions between tribes at the local and national levels post-independence. Such tensions have fundamentally challenged the central government in Juba and led to the dismissal of ministers and state governors – and, in turn, to accusations that the president was acting unconstitutionally.

The president of South Sudan appears to have grown the Republican Guard within the SPLM as a private, Dinka-dominated army. There were ongoing tensions between the SPLM and SPLA-Nasir, which was a splin-
ter group of the SPLM led by Riek Machar. Dominated by the Nuer ethnic group, it killed thousands of Dinka in the Bor massacre of 1991 before Machar made a treaty with the government of Sudan in 1997 and became head of the government-backed SSDF. A similar tribal-based tension and political power struggle led to the outbreak of civil conflict in December 2013 between the SPLM opposition movement (dominated by the Nuer), headed by the former vice president, Riek Machar; and the governing SPLM (dominated by the Dinka).

From 14 January 2014, the escalation has attracted the participation of the Uganda People’s Defense Force (the armed forces of Uganda) in support of Salva Kiir to “prevent a genocide” and to avert negative developments in the neighborhood. The military’s engagement cannot therefore be separated from the struggle between the governments of South Sudan and Uganda against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which continues to conduct brutal attacks on remote villages in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. However, the Ugandan opposition pointed to the need for troops from other states, including from the international community, to help contain and resolve the conflict, within a clear timeframe and a more specific mandate. There is a clear fear that an open mandate could draw Uganda into a spiraling regional conflict with multiple drivers.

Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

DDR in South Sudan is rooted in the CPA and activities began in 2009, but after South Sudan’s secession in 2011, the legal imperative for DDR ended. As the SPLA has absorbed militia groups, its size has outpaced the modest DDR agenda. In April 2011, a National DDR Commission (NDDRC) was set up, which came into effect in October 2012 and included plans to demobilize 150,000 people over the next six to eight years. However, financial and logistical constraints, as well as ownership of the initiative, meant that only 500 people, not the expected 4,500 people, would be demobilized in the pilot project. Although there was suspicion about the UN initially putting emphasis on implementation through Khartoum in an earlier program, vocational training and education programs from UNESCO and the Ministry of General Education could still hold out promise for effective reintegration.

The Ministry of Defense in South Sudan has little influence over the border or over anti-government forces operating across South Sudan, and is unlikely to see the need for DDR
during periods of conflict. This point is illustrated by the new rebel group led by Riek Machar in Western Equatoria State, by armed factions in Jonglei State, and by a rebellion in Greater Upper Nile in 2014 as part of a broader civil war from December 2013. A first step to effective DDR is therefore to reduce tensions with Sudan through exerting total control over all its armed forces. Doing this will require addressing tribal grievances and setting up a political system that is able to provide clearer rules about accountability, military engagement, and other limits to reduce the potential for human rights abuses by the armed forces.

While the Legislative Assembly still stands as a retirement option for military commanders, rather than as a clearly defined profession insulated from special interests, there will remain the possibility for both a corrupt political system in general and little progress on DDR specifically. A crony legislative structure is tolerated because opposition figures and split loyalties could easily morph into further open confrontation, which would destabilize the nascent government in Juba.

The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is unable to solve the problem of forced disarmament through its current mandate; its mission is to simultaneously work with the government of South Sudan, and yet its monitoring role can lead it to being recurrently denied access to sensitive areas, which is in direct violation of the Status of Forces Agreement. The challenge will be to manage the internal instability within South Sudan. If poorly managed, it could adversely affect the oil industry on which the whole economy depends.

Due to human rights concerns, UNMISS has been forced to distance itself from the SPLA, rather than be drawn into a potential civil war in which UNMISS could find itself outgunned. This has made it less effective than it might otherwise be. UNMISS still has great potential to avert major assaults against the civilian population through regular patrols that are able to monitor developing situations from the ground and air. However, a lack of contact with the civilian population (which regards the multinational force as “suspect” after it kept quiet over aerial bombardment by Sudan) and limited resources means UNMISS is spread too thinly, and therefore overly reliant on contracted air assets.

This has led to further related problems. Sudan has violated South Sudan’s airspace for bombing attacks, reconnaissance purposes, and to send supplies to allied militia groups, and UN aircraft have been misidentified and attacked by accident. NGOs could form a bridge between UNMISS and the local information necessary to
provide resources at the county level to support conflict resolution. There are also numerous actors involved in peace-building between Sudan and South Sudan, ranging from China to IGAD, which are currently playing less active roles than the AU and UN, and could step up their involvement in mediation.

Since the 1990s, there have continued to be small local village militias called “White Army” militias. These tend to be armed civilians, usually comprising youth. Disarmament occurred in Upper Nile and Jonglei States between January and August 2006, but this tended to be resisted due to the following factors:

* a fear or hatred of the SPLA
* a perceived need to use weapons for protection
* a general dislike of being unarmed, which may be a conditioning of war or a perception of threats on the border with Ethiopia
* weapons are dual use, defensive and offensive, meaning they can be used offensively for cattle rustling and blood feuds, in the case of the Nuer

Additional issues concern:

* anxiety about leaving behind a different life in a militia group and being able to transition into a new civilian life
* DDR candidates being suspicious about why they were selected first
* feelings of being rejected by the army
* uncertainty over army pensions

By 2014, one million people had been displaced following the civil war that began in December 2013, and the number of dead had reached 10,000. Insufficient DDR due to the complex and challenging (post)-conflict environment has contributed to insecurity and weak institutional capacity of national institutions, along with political uncertainty, lack of coordination among sectors, weak civil society, and limited resources for development. Apart from the human development situation in South Sudan being called “deplorable” by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), conflict continues to set back progress on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This is reflected in the increasing number of cases of malaria, cholera, HIV/AIDS, polio, leprosy, measles, malnutrition, and infant mortality that have been reported.

**Security and Governance**

Over the course of the coming years, South Sudan and its international donors will face the complex task of building state structures, systems, institutions, and capacity designed to stabilize a precarious security situation and a weak economy. UNMISS, which oversees the state-building process, is expected to spend about $1 billion every year on operations.
The EU spent €260 million in the 2011-13 period, and the United States
is spending that every year, including on roads, fighting malaria, and
education for internally displaced persons. The donor objectives are
multifaceted: avoiding destabilizing an already unstable region, avoiding
conflict with Sudan, and building capacity where there is a lack of basic
infrastructure.

**Human Capital**

Human capital is mostly tied up in the military, to which the South Sudan
government pays a salary as a way to avoid ethnic tensions. This has
resulted in the unfortunate situation of inadvertently creating a new class-
based society. It means that rural communities have no resources to use
for their own development, and the health care budget is under intense
pressure to support military salaries. Creating a fair economic plan, inclusive of the security budget, is therefore central to maintaining peace in a
region. The development of human capital is compounded by a lack of
physical infrastructure and poverty. More than half of the eight million
people of South Sudan live below the poverty line. Furthermore, South Sudan has a 73-percent illiteracy rate. Education service provision is vital to
the security-development equation because it will lay the foundations for
the rehabilitation and reintegration of security forces into a revised economy.

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**The Oil Sector**

Sudan and South Sudan’s combined oil reserves measure 6.8 billion barrels (the third-largest in sub-Saharan Africa), three-quarters of which are
located in South Sudan. In the short term, oil can help finance the govern-
ment budget and attract much-needed foreign direct investment (FDI). Oil
accounted for 60 percent of GDP in 2010, while subsistence agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries accounted for 14.5 percent, government services
9.1 percent, trade, hotels and restaurants 5.9 percent, manufacturing and
mining 3.6 percent, construction 3 percent, and other services 2 percent.
Out of eight states in the region, South Sudan ranked fourth for GDP
in 2010. However, its dependence on oil for 98 percent of its budget makes
the current economy unsustainable. South Sudan experiences volatile
price changes, it has no buffer (no stabilization fund), and an almost
total dependence on Khartoum for oil payments. The oil shutdown in
January 2012 due to security concerns shows how vulnerable South Sudan is.

Since 2012-13, South Sudan’s budget reflects the fact that it has
had to slash spending, boost tax revenues, and raise loans (loans from
commercial banks and foreign loans) to make up for lost income from
oil. This means that basic services
have yet to reap the rewards from the country’s national resources. After being affected by decades of war, oil money is supplementing donor support for the army. Seventy percent of the national budget is spent on army pay, pensions, and hardware, which reflects the insecurities felt from Sudan prior to, during, and after secession and ongoing difficulties in implementing meaningful DDR.

**The Agricultural Sector**
The GOSS Growth Strategy 2009 identifies the highest-priority constraints on which the government should focus: insecurity, poor infrastructure, and multiple taxation. Since the majority of people live in rural areas, broad-based growth means creating more opportunities in the agricultural sector. Such a strategy could also relieve some of the pressure on aid organizations such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), which finds that insecurity, poor infrastructure, low capacity, and a lack of competition adds to the cost of operations, which in turn affects their efficiency, scope, and reach.

South Sudan needs to diversify quickly in order to secure its GDP, and agriculture holds many opportunities by increasing employment and contributing to food security. Agriculture could be part of a broad-based diversification approach that includes growth of the manufacturing, tourism, hydro-electric power, and mining industries. Without employment from these industries and a productive tax base, streams of rent, and an ability to borrow, state building becomes impossible. Development of the agricultural sector should be accompanied by legislation that explicitly guarantees nomadic and minority rights (such as grazing rights) and will reduce conflict and the illegal sale of land. The South Sudan Land Act 2009 allows for such claims through recognition of customary land rights under customary land law, increasing seasonal access, in addition to freehold and leasehold ownership. This will be administered through a land classification system that includes public land, community land (based on ethnicity, residence, or interest), and private land. How and whether this system will be enforced at the national, state, or “boma” (the lowest administrative unit in the local government structure) levels are yet to be determined.

**Physical Infrastructure**
Infrastructure projects could not only add much-needed employment, but also rapidly improve the life chances for all groups. Labor-intensive works such as these should be funded now by donors and oil revenue, with a view to facilitating intra-regional trade and export options for South Sudan. Access to international markets remains
a primary concern, since facilitating it will allow the new state to increase monetary exchange (and taxes), attract much-needed FDI for public works projects, increase urbanization, and mobilize resources for state-building and development. Realistically, this process, which is exacerbated by low population density, could take decades to achieve.

In 2005, a UN development expert estimated that Juba had one seven-mile stretch of good bitumen road. By 2010, it was estimated that there were only 11 miles of tarmac road in Juba (with a population of 1.1 million in 2010) and only 30 miles across the whole of South Sudan. By 2012, the situation had improved slightly, with a new 119-mile highway connecting Juba and the Ugandan border, a not inconsiderable distance, and vital to boosting trade with East Africa. However, rural communities resent development in Juba, and for a sustainable peace to occur, development must be balanced across the widely diverse regions of South Sudan. The extent to which development must also be prioritized in the rural regions was highlighted by the 2,000 people who died in local tribal conflicts in 2009, partly due to food shortages.

Since the road via Kapoeta and Lokichoggio is unsafe, the only other import/export options for South Sudan are through Sudan or Uganda, whichever is closer to each South Sudan region. A priority alongside securing the vital transport links is to ensure that imports from Kenya and Uganda are balanced out by substantial growth in domestic production. Agriculture currently represents only 1-2 percent of potential farmland, and water resources, fish stocks, oil, gold, and other mineral deposits all remain largely untapped.

**Arms Control**

In 2008, it was estimated that around two million firearms were in circulation among the civilian population of South Sudan. The sources of firearms varied from militia (which were relied upon by both Sudanese and South Sudanese forces during the civil war for tactical and economic reasons), and proximity to other conflict zones (in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa). Such proximity has facilitated the transfer of some small weapons and light arms (SWLA) from Uganda, the DRC, and Chad to South Sudan. This has been exacerbated in some cases by the Acholi, Anuak, Nuer, and Toposa ethnic groups, which straddle the borders of South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.

The CPA inadequately addressed the number of armed groups in its provision for South Sudan’s security, citing the only armed forces as the Sudan Armed Forces, the SPLA, and foreign insurgency groups. However, the role of civilian militias grew in line
with increasing frustration with the government and the SPLA. Indeed, some elements of the SPLA joined the militias, facilitated by tribal loyalties, which added to their strength. These groups are engaged in banditry, animal rustling, and other criminal activities. However, disarming such groups has been met with resistance (notably in the civilian disarmament initiative of 2006), due to community-level and cross-border security dynamics. Like some parts of the United States, many South Sudanese consider bearing arms a right, reinforced by issues of status and masculinity.

**Border Control**

UNMISS and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) provide technical advice on border control. The EU tackles cross-border instability through the Instrument for Stability which, during 2012-13, included:

* Enhancing National Capacities for Conflict Mapping, Analysis and Transformation in Sudan (CRMA South Sudan), which focuses on information management analysis and mapping of socio-economic risks;
* South Sudan Cross-Border Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building, which supports negotiations between the transhumant and sedentary communities at the Sudan-South Sudan border;
* Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC), which is an arms control, recovery, and capacity-building project, and which also supports gender issues;
* Peace and Stability Quick Impact Fund for the South-North Border Areas of South Sudan, which works on high-profile, quick, and flexible fixes to local communities through the establishment of small-scale socio-economic programs, such as water and sanitation; and
* Working Towards Preventing and Reducing Violence in Jonglei State, which will facilitate dialogue on arms issues, again improve water and sanitation, and help train the Armed Forces on human rights before they deploy on disarmament or counter-insurgency operations.

Part of the solution to border control still lies in the strengthening of relevant law. For example, although the EU mission to South Sudan emphasizes gender rights, a South Sudanese gender-based violence act could more effectively establish social norms and strengthen legal mechanisms at all levels (including in the military) to protect women and girls from violence. Support for victims is also central to addressing the root causes of gender-based or inter-tribal abuses, and forming a coherent strategy for their prevention as well as customary compensation.

**Administration**
In 2005, following the implementation of the CPA, governments and aid agencies pooled their funding in the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), which was supposed to support an administration system, infrastructure, and the provision of basic services. With an initial capitalization of $524 million, $350 million was not spent as of 2009. Bottlenecks in aid spending have preceded alleged corruption at the mid-level of South Sudan’s government, which continues to threaten the continuity and consistency of development progress. The top-level of government has not been immune from corruption allegations either, including accusations of grand corruption, embezzlement of $4 billion by 75 current and ex-government officials, and patron-client relationships along tribal lines. State-building and institution-building rely on census information, taxes, the identification of problems, and rolling out social services (including health, education, water, electricity, and infrastructure). It also relies on a strong state, but there appears to be a serious implementation problem. In avoiding political marginalization as outlined in the CPA, and giving traditional authorities a voice in the provinces as outlined in The Local Government Act 2009, unexpected problems have followed. Some scholars note that decentralization has been broadly applied to all of South Sudan’s internal structures, perhaps to avoid unitary state disasters. However, this has fundamentally weakened the effectiveness of the South Sudanese government at a critical stage of state building, state consolidation, resolving insecurity, and building a national identity.

Meanwhile, donor funds that were supposed to target longer-term development ambitions, such as the MDGs, have by necessity been reallocated to address instability and humanitarian crises. The United States is providing $127 million in development assistance out of a total of $906 million of assistance for Sudan and South Sudan (mainly for South Sudan). By taking this approach, the longer-term state-building objectives will become diminished and the prospects for rapid and effective state building more elusive. The challenge for the government in Juba is to reduce the cost of administration and enhance government effectiveness, which can only be done in a sustainable way once meaningful reforms are complete. With this achieved, the donor community would be able to invest in more developmental objectives and build capacity in vital turnkey areas, such as education and health care.

**Conclusion**

This article illustrates that the challenges to South Sudanese development are comprehensive, but that they can be addressed through cooperation.
in core areas associated with security and development. Generating higher oil revenues through ramping up cooperation with Sudan and boosting trade in East Africa is vital to building a national economy and implementing a large-scale and viable DDR program. Further agreements on oil revenue sharing and a sustainable transport fees structure will also help to build confidence and generate political will on other unresolved political issues from the CPA. On the other hand, accessing East African markets and exploring new oil transit routes may be the solution if political tensions persist between Juba and Khartoum.

There is an opportunity here for the UN-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to advance momentum in these areas. Meanwhile, other regional allies (such as Uganda and Kenya) and stakeholders (such as IGAD and China) could do more to boost infrastructure investments, which would enhance local and regional security and provide alternative routes to the international oil market. Increasing their participation in finding a resolution to ending conflict in Blue Nile and South Kordofan States could also boost the potential for humanitarian access into those regions.

The multifarious incarnations of tribalism show that rolling out a clear and well-thought-through national political agenda (including rational rather than divisive changes to the constitution) could lead the way to a virtuous cycle of limiting tensions, enhancing cooperation, and delivering substantive change. Now that institutional structures and an agreement (albeit severely weakened) have been established, which balance centralized power with greater social inclusion, they should be re-enforced by the international community, including the European Union, United States, IGAD, and UNMISS. A lack of enforcement will perpetuate the cycle of conflict. Thus, UNMISS should revisit its current mandate.

A greater focus on state-building will also help to tip the balance away from militia forces and interests in maintaining army pensions, and establish incentives between DDR and new or expanding areas of economic activity. This goes back to implementing a more ambitious national budget based on increasing returns from oil output. Doing so will help broaden and deepen diversification measures and prosperity across South Sudanese states, which are needed to create new vested interests, social inclusion, and funding for an enhanced national security structure.

Notes
1 “Humanitarian Intervention Plan (HIP) Sudan and South Sudan,” European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection


7 Schomerus and De Vries, “Improvising Border Security.”


11 Nhial Tutlam, Liberating South Sudan One Patient at a Time (Bloomington: Xlibris, 2013), 52.


20 Pa’gan Amum, “Perspectives on the Sudan, South Sudan Crisis” (transcript of speech),

21 Amur, “Perspectives on the Sudan, South Sudan Crisis,” 4-5.


26 Email interview with Omar Shurkian, Principal Representative of the SPLM-N Office in the UK and Ireland, 23 February 2013.

27 Email interview with Omar Shurkian.

28 Email interview with Omar Shurkian.


35 Knopf, Ending South Sudan’s Civil War, 8.


39 Astill-Brown, “South Sudan’s Slide into Conflict,” 6-7.


42 Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, “Parliament Backs Deployment of UPDF in South Sudan.”

43 “DDR in South Sudan,” Small Arms Survey,


“South Sudan: Jonglei – ‘We Have Always Been at War,'” 6.


Cockett, Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State, 255.


south-sudan-oil-basic-services.

65 Cockett, Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State, 254.


70 Cockett, Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State, 255.


72 Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur, 206.


76 “Southern Sudan,” 1-4.

77 Email interview with members of the EU External Action Service, South Sudan, 18 June 2013.


79 Cockett, Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State, 258.


Photo

Separated by Light

Jide Ajide

Elizabeth Bruce

Elizabeth R. Bruce holds a Bachelor of Education with Honors in Textile Chemistry from Clemson University and a Master of Education in Globalization and Educational Change from Lehigh University. Her personal research interests center on sub-Saharan Africa, specifically HIV/AIDS, health sciences education, and health research partnerships. Elizabeth has also been involved with collaborative work examining the scientization of mass education worldwide.

In Unequal Partners: American Foundations and Higher Education Development in Africa, Fabrice Jaumont focuses on American private foundation efforts since 2000 to invigorate the interest of governments and policymakers in higher education and their networks throughout Africa. Reflecting this renewed interest, the primary subject of this work is the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa (PHEA), which began in 2000 as an informal pursuit by the presidents of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, with the subsequent addition of the William and Flora Hewitt Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the Kresge Foundation. Its origins stemmed from a desire to elevate specifically higher, rather than primary, education. Pooling their reputations and willingness to focus on sub-Saharan Africa’s higher education landscape, the Partnership maximized achievement, while subsequently enhancing
each participating foundation. Nine countries, including Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, benefited until the PHEA's termination in 2010.

Jaumont zeroes in on institutional aspects, rather than applying the hegemonic lens noted as frequently used to look at United States foundation work abroad, bringing the relational aspects of philanthropy to the forefront throughout the book’s three parts. Following a foreword by Carnegie Corporation of New York President Vartan Gregorian, Jaumont’s first section assesses the “ecology” of United States foundations specifically working in Africa, situating the interplay of higher education and philanthropy historically. What emerges is a philanthropic environment in Africa that, in 2000, was riddled with inconsistencies and lack of collaboration. This helped set the stage for the founding of the PHEA. In light of empirical data demonstrating American foundations’ preference for working in current or former Commonwealth countries with English as the primary language, Jaumont touches briefly on the geopolitical and economic potential for the United States of these connections before returning to his institutional focus.

The book’s second section begins by framing philanthropic foundations as institutions underpinned by very human interactions, and sets the stage for the question of legitimacy considered in the book’s third part. His institutional focus allows the relationships of philanthropic endeavors to emerge, and Jaumont focuses on the PHEA’s ability to operate using a “competitive-collaborative approach” while simultaneously maintaining, and actually buoying, individual reputations and the individuality of each participating foundation. Thus, individual foundations were themselves strengthened by knowledge transfer resulting from the Partnership’s approach, leading to more efficiency and better risk management across the individual foundations themselves. Collaboration of the PHEA was visible in its ability to reach agreement on strategies through consultation, as with the “joint initiatives” funding mechanism, while individuality could be maintained as each participating foundation continued to make grants, the most common funding mechanism, as each saw fit.

Jaumont presents the close links between leadership and ownership in the particular situation of the PHEA. Perhaps not unexpectedly for an entity that began as a presidential initiative, he portrays the tremendous influence of individual foundation presidents on the Partnership, producing frequent challenges to joint work being pursued by the PHEA’s own program officers, directors, and grantees. The termi-
nation of the PHEA in 2010 aligned with a number of leadership changes across participating foundations.

The third section of the book looks at the issue of legitimacy, defined for the reader as “foundations’ ability to serve the needs and interests of universities and higher education organizations” through “exchange” among them. In this section, he distills the analysis of the PHEA to “a virtuous circle of serving and being served,” while being simultaneously situated within an internal and transverse organizational setting possessing its own dynamics. Foundational motivation is noted to have arisen from institutional, environmental, and actor-based elements. Environmental elements, important considerations for policymakers, are particularly highlighted as the PHEA was working on a continent where resources were frequently lacking and governments were not always willing partners. In its efforts to address institutional development and capacity-building, environmental elements repeatedly asserted themselves.

This discussion of capacity-building throughout the chapters emerges as remarkable, as Jaumont frequently refers to its function as a “ceremonial rite” and “myth,” as well as its presence in discourse as a “buzz word” and a form of “rhetoric.” On this subject, the author clearly desires to distinguish his way of thinking from that of neo-institutionalists, declaring the PHEA’s preoccupation with capacity-building above all else as stemming from “charismatic” foundational leadership and not the “societal situation prevailing at the time of … inception,” a rationale neo-institutionalist would be inclined to offer. Neo-institutionalists would be reasonable in doing so, for, as Deborah Eade pointed out, capacity-building was to the 1990s, just before the founding of the PHEA, what scaling-up was to the 1980s. Jaumont, however, seems skeptical of the concept so widely referenced across the philanthropic and non-profit sector everywhere, possibly the reason he repeatedly praises the PHEA’s work in the more tangible Bandwidth Initiative, with its more measurable outcomes and concrete results. This skepticism is interesting from a policymaking perspective, as it raises important issues: Who is assessing capacities already present on the ground? Who is assessing what capacities are needed going forward? How is successful capacity-building, should that be the focus, defined?

As a resource, the book offers more case study than practical recommendation, although it is a case study of a remarkable endeavor. Jaumont offers numerous ways, here and there, that the distance between the PHEA grantors and grantees was offset during the PHEA’s duration, including through direct involvement by Africans themselves, establishment of field offices by
certain participating foundations, and careful consideration of the timing of announcements. Notably, despite the book’s focus on institutional dynamics and relationships, the unequal nature of partnership between American foundations and the African higher education sector seen with the PHEA still emerges, just as it does through the application of a more hegemonic lens.

Notes

2 Jaumont, Unequal Partners, 62.
3 Jaumont, Unequal Partners, 82.
4 Jaumont, Unequal Partners, 93.
5 Jaumont, Unequal Partners, 83.
7 Jaumont, Unequal Partners, 133.
The African Development Conference at Harvard University hosted a keynote speech with H.E. John Dramani Mahama, the former president of the Republic of Ghana. President Mahama had previously served as vice president of the Republic of Ghana under the late President John Atta Mills.

The Africa Policy Journal sat down with H.E. Mahama during his visit to discuss his recent book, regional cooperation, and the future of African development. The following is an edited version of the interview. For more of our interviews, please visit apj.hkspublications.org/category/interviews/.

APJ: You recently launched your book, *My First Coup D’Etat*. How did you come up with the concept?

Mahama: The book is actually like an autobiography. It is a recollection of my growing-up years and the title is from the first story in the book. The first coup d’etat I’m referring to is the coup d’etat of 1966 that overtook Nkrumah. The title is provocative, because people ask, “What coup d’etat? Have you been involved in a coup d’etat before?” When you read the book, you will understand. That was the coup that had quite an impact on me, because my dad had been a minister in Nkrumah’s government, and when the coup took place he was put into detention. I was in a boarding school at the time and everybody forgot about me. They didn’t come and pick me from school when the
school vacated! My dad decided to relocate to the north after he was released from detention and he took the whole family with him, and that’s why I attended school and grew up in Tamale. Basically, the book is all about my growing-up years and all that.

APJ: During the era of Nkrumah, Ghana was seen as a real force for Pan-Africanism. What are your thoughts on the future of the Pan-African movement?

Mahama: It’s a pity that the Pan-African movement has lost quite some steam. We tried to revive it. We hosted the last Pan-African Congress in Ghana and brought Pan-Africans from across the world. There’s a division in the Pan-Africanism movement, unfortunately, between Africa and the Caribbean. I think the bickering is not necessary. All of us are Africans, whether you are on the continent or you are in the diaspora, and so I think it’s time for us to come together and work to promote the interest of Africans wherever they are. I’ve tried in my own way as president to do a few things that promote Pan-Africanism. For instance, I removed visa requirements for all African passport holders. Anybody who has an African passport can travel to Ghana and apply for the visa on arrival, instead of having to go to an embassy and look for a visa. Aside from that, before I left office we gave Ghanaian citizenship officially to more than 20 Caribbean nationals. We are doing all that to promote the bond amongst ourselves, the African family. I believe that the bickering that is taking place about who owns the movement and the leadership and all of that is not necessary.

APJ: We recently had Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. There’s a lot of change in the world. Where do you think Africa falls into it?

Mahama: I think it’s an ill wind that is blowing across the whole world. Fareed Zakaria of CNN said in one of his programs that it looks like the glue that held the world together is becoming undone. There is the rise of xenophobia, the rise of populist ideologies, fascist ideologies, and things like that. It’s becoming fashionable across the world for people to fear those who are coming in because they think they’re coming to take their jobs. People don’t realize that some of the countries that are expressing these sentiments have grown great because of migrants who came in. No country can exist in isolation; you cannot build a wall around yourself. You lose competitiveness if you isolate yourself like that.

Africa is moving in the right direction, but we need to accelerate the pace of that movement because of demographic reasons. Our population is growing fast. We have a youth bulge developing: 60 percent of the African population is under 35 years of age, so we need to accelerate our econo-
mies in order to create more jobs for these young people and provide more opportunity for them. Unfortunately, the compartmentalization of the continent and our existence in our small country boundaries makes it very difficult for us to take advantage of the critical mass of the whole continent. If you want to move goods and services from one country to the other, the hustle you go through is great. The EU has become what it is because you can take dairy products from the Scandinavians and zip it across the EU and supply somebody in Portugal or elsewhere. It is already happening in Africa, but it’s happening too slowly. In Southern Africa and East Africa, I can see a customs union forming and a free trade area. It is estimated that the trade among African countries is at about 12 percent. If you take the equivalent for North America, you are talking about 45 percent, and if you look at the EU it is about 60 percent. The bulk of our trade is external. Eighty percent of trade in Africa is with external parties, and so regional integration is something that we need to take very seriously.

I believe that this populist wind that is blowing is a passing fad and with time people will realize that we live together, we flow together, or we sink together. I mean, look at the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. It came into the United States. So, it shows that you cannot wall yourself away from the rest of the world. Look at climate change. It’s not going to affect only one part of the world, it will affect everybody. We need to come together and act together, because God put all of us on this planet for a purpose.

**APJ**: Speaking of our regional integration in West Africa, are there any steps you think that ECOWAS should take?

**Mahama**: With integration, the regional economic groups are spearheading it, but the AU is coordinating it overall. I was the chairman of the High Trade Commission of the AU and I know that the South African and East African areas are ready to launch a free trade area, and that’s a good thing. The next region that is ready is ECOWAS. What we agreed to do in the AU is for SADC and the EAC to take the lead, and then for ECOWAS to join, so that in those regions we can move goods freely in the customs union without having to pay levies and duties.

**APJ**: Do you think the language barriers in West Africa bring a special kind of problem?

**Mahama**: I don’t really think it should. We have English-speaking and French-speaking, but aside from that, traditionally our people have traded amongst each other because our cultures and languages spill across the borders. For instance, if you take Ghana, when you look at people on one side of the border and those on
the other side, most of them are related with each other. Until that border was drawn, nobody recognized that there was a difference between the people. Even now with the border, there are people who live in Togo and have their families in Ghana and vice versa, so I don’t think that should be much of a problem. There’s already an informal trade that takes place in agricultural products. For example, corn is moved across the border either from Ghana into Togo; tomatoes are brought from Burkina Faso into Ghana; onions are brought from northern Togo into Ghana, and so forth. So we just need to formalize this trade and make sure that we remove the obstacles that these traders face when they have to move goods across our borders.

**APJ:** China has had a growing role on the continent. Is there any risk that you think that we should specifically be wary of? Also, are there any opportunities that you think we should be taking advantage of as a continent?

**Mahama:** I think China has been very favorably disposed towards Africa. China for many years described itself as a developing country and socialized with Africa, and I think that’s a good thing. China’s growth has been an advantage to Africa because of the increase in consumption of commodities. Africa is basically a commodity-exporting continent, and so with China increasing its consumption of minerals and oil and other things, the price of these commodities went up. Unfortunately, because of China’s slowdown, it looks like commodity prices are crashing, and so it is beginning to affect some of the economies in Africa that are not as diversified. As leaders, we need to diversify economies more and not rely only on commodity-driven exports. However, I think there is also an opportunity because China is shedding low-paying jobs like textiles, and those labor-intensive jobs and some of these jobs are moving to Vietnam and other South Asian countries. I think that if Africa positions itself properly then it could take more of those jobs in, so that we can provide opportunities for our young people and become the next manufacturing hub in light industry, textiles, garments, and other things. Africa could become the next major production hub for the rest of the world.

**APJ:** Ghana has a nascent oil industry. What are you doing to avoid the pitfalls of oil production? How can you learn from Nigeria and other countries who were susceptible to the resource curse to ensure that everyone benefits from the extraction?

**Mahama:** Ghana has no excuse to have that pitfall because we’ve had a lot of experiences to learn from. I’ve said that I don’t stigmatize Nigeria for all the problems Nigeria has faced with regards to its oil and gas resource,
because Nigeria had nobody to learn from. Nigeria discovered oil in the late 50s and 60s. Everything Nigeria has developed with its oil and gas industry it has learned from its own experience. When we discovered oil and gas, there were two countries that were very helpful to Ghana in terms of creating the correct laws and learning from their experiences so that the resource becomes a blessing and not a curse. Those two countries were Norway and Nigeria. We learned a lot from Norway about how they have managed their resources very well, and we learned a lot from Nigeria about how not to mismanage. Our Nigerian neighbors were very generous with their experience. They said, “We did this, it was a mistake and this is how we corrected it over the years.” We learned a lot from Nigeria and we learned a lot from Norway; thus Ghana does not have any excuse for mismanagement. So far, I think that the accountability systems that have been put in place are working. We have the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, which shows strictly how oil revenue should be used. Every year, the minister of finance must go to the Parliament, and he must say how much is expected from oil revenues, and he must state to Parliament exactly how he wants to use the revenues. I believe Ghana has had the opportunity to learn from many countries, and as a result there’s better management of the resource.

Nigeria has done quite well in terms of building capacity in the oil and gas sector. We passed a local content bill in Ghana, and it says that indigenous companies must have a certain percentage of contracts that are given in the oil and gas sector. Unfortunately, there are no Ghanaian companies with the expertise to be able to bid on and win those contracts. I’ve noticed that a lot of the companies that have managed to win these contracts are Ghana-Nigerian partnerships. Nigeria has come with the technical know-how, Ghanaians have come with the partnership of citizenship and being able to register as an indigenous company. They’ve come together and joined ventures and they have done quite well. As a result of the local content bill, indigenous companies have won up to a billion dollars in contracts in the oil and gas sector. A lot the legislation on local content that we passed was borrowed from Nigeria.

Another good thing we did was implement a “no flare” policy for gas, and we learned that from Nigeria. We are going both for the oil and for the gas, and all the gas that has been produced is being piped onshore, processed, and we are using it to generate power.

APJ: Value-additions to extracted resources is an issue that African countries have struggled with for a
while. Are there plans for refining in Ghana?

**Mahama:** The first consignment of Ghanaian oil was delivered to the Tema Oil Refinery in November or December last year [2016], and they processed it. So, we are looking at doing the processing locally.

**APJ:** My final question is about the diaspora. Are there any plans to connect with them more? There are a lot of skilled people of African descent who are educated in the West and would be happy to come back and work on the continent.

**Mahama:** It’s happening already. There are lots of Ghanaians and Africans relocating to Africa with the skills they learned abroad. The financial crisis has been a gain for Africa because it’s reversed the brain drain. For instance, if you look at Ghana, a lot of the IT start-ups are being created by people who have come back from the diaspora. Increasingly, many of them are going into the hospitality industry and are building hotels and providing other services.

If you look at the professionals who are coming out, not many are seeking to leave anymore because they realize it’s just as difficult out there as it is back home. In that case, you might as well stay at home and try to make a life, so I think that is good.

**APJ:** Thank you very much.

**Mahama:** Thank you too.
Deadline: December 1st, 2018

The Africa Policy Journal (APJ) at the Harvard Kennedy School invites established and emerging scholars, including researchers, journalists, artists, and/or policy practitioners, to submit their work to APJ’s 13th Edition publication. APJ will accept research articles, book reviews, commentaries, and artwork for print publication consideration through November 15, 2018. APJ also accepts Op-Eds/Blogs and artwork for web publication consideration on a rolling basis. All submissions must be the author’s original work and previously unpublished.

Articles and op-eds should explore the relationship between policy-making and economic, social, or political change affecting African countries today. Book and film reviews should critically assess a recent work of importance to culture, politics, and society in Africa. Artwork should reflect a celebration or critique of African cultures and/or the development of African communities.

Submission Guidelines
All submissions must adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style formatting guidelines.
- Academic Articles: 2,500 - 7,000 words, and must include an abstract of no more than 100 words;
- Op-eds/Commentaries: 750 - 2,000 words, and include references where appropriate;
- Book/film reviews: 500 - 1,000 words, and must include the full citation, including publisher/director and year of publication/original release date;
- Artwork: Submit high-resolution files (300 dpi, JPEG format). Each submission must include artwork title, artist name, medium, and year of creation;
- Blogs: 500 - 800 words

How to Submit
Format all articles/op-eds/book/film reviews as Microsoft Word documents
Format all images as JPEG files
For all citations, use Endnotes with a web link for fact-checking
All submissions must include a cover letter with:
(1) author’s name; (2) mailing address; (3) e-mail address; (4) phone number; (5) a biography of no more than 300 words; (6) a headshot.

All submissions received by November 15, 2018 will be considered for print publication. APJ’s Editorial Board will notify all applicants by January 15, 2019. Selected authors may be asked to perform additional fact-checking or editing before publication; compliance with these procedures is required for publication.

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The Africa Policy Journal is the only student-run scholarly journal in the United States dedicated to African policy. Our mission is to promote a rigorous, informed, and influential policy dialogue that is relevant to current and future issues of governance, economics, politics, and society on the African continent. We publish thought-provoking content that provides fresh insights into the most significant opportunities and challenges facing African nations.

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